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Abstract
This PhD thesis investigates the role of the reduction of fiscal autonomy and
uncertainty in the allocation of resources in driving the behaviour of Italian
municipalities in non-autonomous regions and of the central government.
Focusing on the uncertainty of grants to compensate the abolition of the
property tax on main dwellings, we construct a regression discontinuity (RD)
and regression kink (RK) design to test how the behaviour of municipalities
changes depending on whether they are in a “bad” state (when they manage
fewer resources after property tax reform) or in a “good” state (when they
manage more resources after property tax reform), and also in light of the
“partisan effect” (the mechanism that allows central governments to allocate
more resources to the lower layer of government politically aligned with it).
An empirical analysis of Italian municipalities suggests that:
1. Municipalities acted differently in terms of waste tax implementation.
Their behaviour depended on the benefits or costs they assumed af-
ter the abolition of the property tax on main dwellings: in particular
municipalities that suffered a loss of resources increased the waste tax
more;
2. Property tax reform led to an imperfect substitution between the prop-
erty tax on the main dwelling and the waste tax, with a consequent
loss in equality;
3. Despite the weakness of the ex-post control and the absence of pun-
ishment for lying municipalities concerning the definition of a compen-
satory grant may allow the presence of a weak “partisan effect”, the
reform of the main dwelling property tax was transparent in resources
allocation.
Hence, the thesis is structured as follows: first, we focus on the rules and
economic literature concerning local public finance; then, we analyse the be-
haviour of Italian municipalities as a response to the abolition of the property
tax on the main dwelling; finally, we test the presence of the “partisan effect”.
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Chapter 1
Local fiscal policy: the
institutional framework
1.1 Introduction
During the 2008 national election, the political debate was monopolised by
discussion about the abolition of the property tax (“imposta comunale sugli
immobili, I.C.I.”) on the main dwelling. The centre-right premier candidate
used his announcement on I.C.I. abolition as an electoral tool, which helped
him to win the election. Journalists and political researchers agree that
thanks to this announcement the centre-right won the votes of the middle
class. Indeed, as the median voter theorem states, the median voter in Italy
is a homeowner and could thus be influenced by the abolition of a tax on
property. The choice of eliminating this tax was strategic because of its
unpopularity. In 2008 the Italian government promulgated the abolition1
of the property tax on the main dwelling. This measure had important
consequences for Italian municipalities. First, municipalities lost a significant
fiscal tool and second, the substitution of a local tax generated a debate on
how it should be refunded. In particular:
1. The abolition increased uncertainty concerning the municipal budget.
2. The abolition reduced municipal fiscal autonomy.
Italian municipalities can finance themselves through taxation and trans-
fers from the government, region and province. In the 1990’s, governments
began promulgating reforms to guarantee greater autonomy to regions, provinces
1Law decree 93/2008.
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and local entities2. In general, many of these reforms3 involved local finances,
particularly during the early 2000’s. These rule changes were made for rea-
sons of political and fiscal sustainability. In particular, the debate concerned
two main issues: greater fiscal autonomy for local entities (that is, fiscal fed-
eralism) and the reduction of public debt at the national and sub-national
level. To guarantee greater fiscal autonomy, the amount of grants decreased
dramatically during this time, while the number and amount of local taxes
increased. Rules were introduced to guarantee the reduction of public debt
at both the national and sub-national level; one was the Domestic Stability
Pact (the national version of the Stability and Growth Pact).
In this Phd thesis, we analyse the behaviour of municipalities as a reaction
to the abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling, studying the be-
haviour of municipalities in terms of manipulating revenues and expenses.
For this reason, we consider the waste tax, the current expenditure and the
concession of building permits. The last of these represents a growing source
of revenues for municipalities. Indeed, recent literature on this subject (see
for example Ermini, Fiorillo and Santolini, 2013) underlines its use as sub-
stitute for taxation in order to fulfill budget targets. In addition, since 2004
the revenues related to building permits, for a percentage of 75% of them,
could finance the current expenditure4. This law incentivised municipalities
to increase land consumption in order to maintain stable taxation and in-
crease services.
However, uncertainty may have led the municipalities towards two states of
nature: the “good” state occurs when a municipality manages more resources
after property tax reform, and the “bad” state occurs when a municipality
manages fewer resources after property tax reform. When a municipality is
in the “good” state we consider it the “winner” while when it is in the “bad”
state we define it as the “loser”. This differentiation allows investigation
of the fiscal behaviour of both types of municipalities as a response to the
reduction in fiscal autonomy and uncertainty in the allocation mechanism of
resources.
2Law n.142/1990 was the first to draw the principles of the legal system for local
autonomies, substituting the law 383/1934. The Bassanini reform (law 59/1997 and
127/1997) continued the aim of a wider autonomy. It established an important decen-
tralisation process in giving more power to regions and local entities. Finally, the reform
of the Title V of the Italian constitution improved the autonomy of local entities, especially
for regions.
3The decree n. 504/1992 ruled on local taxation. The decree n. 244/1997 defined
equilibrium and equality fiscal rules. It allowed to allocate resources according to public
good provisions. Subsequently, laws on fiscal federalism introduced other criteria that
regulated the grants, giving the government the role to rule the allocation mechanism.
4Law 311/2004.
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Even in the scenario of a slow decrease in grants over time, governments may
allocate a higher amount of grants to those municipalities that are politically
linked to them. Indeed, Italy represents an illustrative laboratory to test the
political use of grants because of the presence of discretionary power in their
allocation5. Thus, this strategy may allow politicians of the majority party
to maintain and even increase votes. Indeed, it may test loyalty of the mayor
who is incentivised to show his loyalty for receiving higher transfers that, in
turn, could raise the probability of re-election. According to the literature
(for example Nannicini and Brollo, 2012) an increase in transfers6 may make
a re-election more likely and may discourage new entrants in elections. In this
way, governments may assure a favourable position in the elections within
their mandate and reinforce their authority in the next governmental elec-
tion. However, it could also generate a vicious cycle, wherein a bad politician
gains support because of his connection to the government. In sum, we want
to test if governments used the possibility of ruling on the distribution of
resources to allocate more resources to mayors belonging to their coalition.
Our approach assumes the existence of “backward-looking” politicians who
reward their “core”7 voters8. Indeed, we want to test if the maximisation
of votes could be considered a further driver in grant allocation beyond the
efficiency and equity principles. It is important to keep in mind that, even
if the maximisation of votes is not a motive in the distribution of transfers,
this does not necessarily mean that the allocation is based solely on efficiency
and equity. In some cases, governments may transfer resources to municipal-
ities that are richer in swing votes. Accordingly, as tested in the literature
(Johansson, 2003), the partisan effect is substituted by the swing vote effect:
politicians may use their roles to gain swing votes.
A shortcoming of this analysis is whether the government can influence dis-
cretionary the amount of transfers to local administrations. It also may not
be clear whether there is space for the government to operate, or whether it
is large enough.
The law regulates the quantity of transfers, which may exclude the possibil-
5Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015) used in their analysis a dataset of
more than 500 municipalities, between 1998 and 2010, who depend on discretionary grants
from the Central Government to fund approximately the 30% of their expenditure.
6Nannicini, Brollo (2012) consider transfers for investments.
7The term “core” means both voters that can be targeted most effectively by parties
and voters ideologically committed with the party ideal point.
8“Opportunistic politicians will direct transfer toward their “core” supporters if they
believe that this is the cheapest way to buy votes. Such behaviour would represent the
“machine” politics that once characterized many large cities in the United States, such as
Boston, Chicago, of New York.” Allan Drazen in Political Economy in Macroeconomics,
Princeton University Press, 2000.
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ity that the government can affect local grants. However, the government
can make rules to manipulate this allocation: for example, it may decide to
transfer more resources to a specific geographic area, because of the presence
of a local party in its coalition. Thus, in this case, it can affect the law in
order to transfer more resource to the north, the centre or the south. Italian
data are valuable for this kind of analysis because grants from the govern-
ment are characterised by significant discretionary elements among OECD
countries (Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli, Redoano, 2015). However, our study
does not analyse the political alignment effect using the standard grants that
governments allocate to municipalities. We use the grants that the 2008 gov-
ernment allocated to the municipalities following the main dwelling property
tax (“I.C.I.”) abolition.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the abolition of this tax had
a hidden goal. Indeed, the abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling
led to both an increase in the amount of grants from the centre to the mu-
nicipalities and a decrease in fiscal autonomy: in short, then, municipalities,
became more dependent on the government.
On the other hand, the decrease in fiscal autonomy and the uncertainty of
the allocation of the no-longer-collected resources may have affected local
fiscal policy, particularly since municipalities must fulfil the fiscal targets es-
tablished by new rules. As stated above, municipalities faced a shortage of
resources, and the reform of 2008 made local finances more dependent on the
central state. For both reasons, the municipal government may react to the
reforms by manipulating local public finance. Municipal politicians faced a
trade-off: on one hand, a politician wanted to guarantee a fiscal discipline
that would allow him to be considered a “good politician”, on the other hand
he wanted to guarantee as many services as possible for citizens.
In this preliminary chapter, we present an overview of the legislation con-
cerning transfers from Italian governments to municipalities. In particular,
we focus on the legislation subsequent to Silvio Berlusconi’s announcement
to eliminate the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling. We consider
laws and deliberations of the main institutions involved to try to find short-
comings, able to justify the presence of the cited effects. Furthermore, we
provide a description of particular municipal taxation and revenue sources.
Our goal is to provide an overview of the context of our analysis.
1.2 Literature on the argument
This PhD thesis focuses on two main arguments of economic literature: the
role of fiscal decentralization/centralization and partisan alignment effect on
10
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economy.
First, the abolition of the main dwelling property tax led to a fall in municipal
fiscal autonomy after years of a decentralization process. The circumstances
that municipalities are not anymore responsible for the establishment of the
main dwelling property tax may have driven them towards different fiscal be-
haviour. Hence, we analyze municipalities reaction to a positive or negative
shock on budgets caused by the more fiscal centralization. Literature on this
subject is very developed, especially for the Italian case of study.
In general, literature on fiscal decentralization/centralization and soft bud-
get constraints involves both the relationship between central state and local
governments and between national countries and supranational government.
In particular, Bordignon (2000) highlighted that the bailout problem and the
connected problem of a perceived “soft budget” constraint at the local level
have been significant in Italian local finance for the last fifty years. These
years were characterized by a high degree of fiscal centralization. This has
caused huge efficiency losses in the provision of local public good and ser-
vices, induced a lack of responsiveness and accountability of local politicians
to local preferences, undermined political participation at both local and
central levels, and generated huge problems for the equilibrium of central
government finances (Bordignon, 2000).
Bordignon, Turati and Gramalerio (2013) argued that autonomy in fiscal
policies, especially in collecting revenues, is more efficient than the use of
fiscal transfer from the central Government. Voters, indeed, may better rec-
ognize the good politician if he sets the tax rate. High tax rates are often
due to bad administration, so if the voter knows it, he can either punish or
reward politicians, efficiently. In addition, authors argued that fiscal decen-
tralization may produce effects in municipalities, which are characterized by
different degrees of vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI). In rich municipalities it
may increase welfare by inducing better-educated politicians to enter into
the election. Instead, the reverse may happen in the poorer municipalities.
Boetti, Piacenza and Turati (2009) reinforced the theory also testing em-
pirically that more fiscal autonomous municipalities exhibits less inefficient
spending behaviour.
Stein (1999), analysing empirically Latin America countries, found that de-
centralization tends to produce larger governments, but this effect is par-
ticularly important in the cases where vertical imbalance is high, transfers
are not formula-based and the degree of borrowing autonomy of subnational
governments is large (Stein, 1999).
Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), instead, analysed theoretically the Ex-
cessive Deficit Procedures (EDP) in Maastricht Treaty on European union.
They argued that where subcentral governments do not own their own tax
11
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base, the only options available to them in the event of financial difficulties
are to default or obtain a bailout (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 1996). Thus,
Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), theoretically, and Stein (1999), empiri-
cally, suggested that a coherent assignment of resources of local governments
is fundamental to avoid soft-budget constraint problems.
Quian and Roland (1998), instead, individuated two effects of fiscal decen-
tralization between national states and supranational government: first fiscal
competition between local governments under factor mobility increases the
opportunity cost of bailout and thus serves as commitment device; second,
monetary centralization, together with fiscal decentralization, induces a con-
flict of interest and may harden budget constraint and reduce inflation (Quian
and Roland, 1998).
Furthermore, an academic and political debate on fiscal federalism took place
in Italy since the mid-1990s, especially at a regional level. Most of the pro-
posals focused on the way to eliminate huge soft budget constraint because
of their central role in the political and economic scenario.
For example, according to Giarda (1995) Northern and Southern regions
must be treated differently according to their different economic endowments
of resources. Northern regions should become entirely independent from the
central government while Southern regions should at least partially be fi-
nanced by vertical grants (Giarda, 1995).
Bosi and Tabellini (1996) advocated a more radical version of the Giarda’s
idea. All regions would be made completely independent from the central
government and vertical grants should be abolished and replaced by formula-
based horizontal grants.
Looking in detail local revenues, we also analyze the behaviour of municipali-
ties in issuing building permits. Italian municipalities experienced a shortage
of resources during years. In addition, new rules (for example, the Domestic
Stability Pact) committed them to a higher fiscal rigidity. For these reasons
municipalities may need new fiscal tools to increase their revenues. Indeed,
literature on the issues of building permits is very developed, especially in the
last few years, that is when municipalities started to use these concessions as
an active fiscal instrument. Ermini, Fiorillo and Santolini (2013) examined
land use policies of Italian municipalities. They found, using Italian data,
that politicians governing municipalities are more concerned about increas-
ing revenues than preserving environment. Indeed, they found that taxes are
used to commit the budget targets.
Ermini and Santolini (2017), instead, analysed the patter of the density
growth using Italian data on 72 urban areas. They found that an increase
in the city’s core property tax rate lead to a decrease in the density on the
urban area, due to dwelling effect. By contrast, an increase in tax rate in
12
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the suburban area causes an increase in the density on the urban area, due
to the so called “improvement effect”9.
Also Sole´-Olle´ and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) analysed, using Spanish data,
whether the political competition may influence the land consumption. They
found that stiffer political competition reduces the amount of land consump-
tion. In addition, they found that this effect is stronger in suburbs, in town
with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities
governed by left parties.
As said before, our analysis deals with the study of local politicians be-
haviour. Indeed, politicians can behave differently according to the fact that
they could be in the good or in the bad state, as defined in the previous
lines. For this reason, our case of study can have analogies with empirical
literature which tested the loss aversion (Kaheman and Tversky, 1979).
Let’s suppose that two identical municipalities A and B had the same amount
of main dwelling property tax in 2007, for example 100. After the abolition,
A received 99 and B received 101, i.e. A had a loss and B had a gain. The
two municipalities may decide to behave differently: A can rise taxes and
B can reduce them. In addition, the tax increase occurred for A could be
greater than the amount of reduction occurred for B. Hence, local politicians
may perceive outcomes as gains and losses compared to some reference point
and consider losses more salient than gains.
In this sense, Kaheman and Tversky (1979) elaborated what they defined
as prospect theory. This implies that the utility function is kinked at the
reference point.
Several empirical experiment have followed the paper written by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979).
Genesove and Mayer (2001) showed that loss aversion affects seller behaviour
in the residential real estate market, where sellers seem to assume the pur-
chase price as the relevant reference point.
Pope and Sxhweitzer (2011) tested for the presence of loss aversion in highly
experienced profession golfers. They analysed detailed data from the PGA
Tour professional golfers’ performance and they demonstrated that profes-
sional golfers are more careful and accurate when they approach par putts.
On the other side, they hit less accurately birdie putts (Pope and Sxhweitzer,
2011). So, they found loss aversion behaviour for profession golfers.
Engstrom, Nordblom, Ohlsson and Persson (2014) studied the behaviour of
taxpayers when filing returns. They found that taxpayers that exhibit a
9The dwelling size effect defines how people react to an increase in taxation. A higher
cost of a housing floor space, obviously, can be associated to a reduction in the dwelling
size (Ermini and Santolini, 2016).
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deficit are loss adverse, that is people with a preliminary deficit are more
likely than people that exhibit a refund to claim a deduction. Obviously,
this finding is not consistent with neoclassical theory. They test it through a
Regression Kink Design (Engstrom, Nordblom, Ohlsson and Persson, 2014).
The second goal of this PhD thesis is to test whether or not governmental
transfers go to core supporters. Indeed, the substitute grant may cause op-
portunistic behavior by central government, i.e. it may allocate more grant
to municipalities politically aligned to it.
Literature on the argument is rich in both empirical and theoretical models.
These papers investigate the maximization vote problem by politicians.
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), for example, pointed out that politicians di-
rect their actions to voters that are not so ideologically committed (“swing”
voters), taking supporters votes for granted.
Dixit and Londregan (1996), instead, presented a model that encompasses
both “core” and “swing” voters approach. They exhibit a model in which
two parties, L (the left-wing party) and R (the right-wing party), compete
in the vector of grants they give to groups of voters. The group can be iden-
tified by location, age, gender, etc. and each one within the group receives
the same amount of transfers. This model is interesting because it highlights
a variety of results.
Politicians have the ability to transfer:
1. If parties have the same abilities to tax and subsidize different groups,
then “swing” voters are likely to be targeted;
2. If parties have different ability in tax and subsidize different groups,
“core” voters are likely to be targeted (targeting becomes most effec-
tively).
Another interesting result of Dixit and Londregan model is that core
supporters may be tagged by negative transfers. A group of strong partisan
voters, who care more on ideologically issues than pecuniary benefits may be
hit by tax and still remain loyal (Dixit and Londregan, 1996).
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), instead, analysed the pork-barrel10 issue, the-
oretically. In particular, they studied the “logrolling” (or vote trading) in
majority system. Their idea was that politicians make actions taking in con-
sideration reciprocity. Each legislator represents a single district and wants
to maximize the utility of that district, for example, by implementing a public
work financed by national taxation. The slogan is “You support my project
10A “pork-barrel” program refers to collectively financed program that increase the
utility of a small group and which have social cost that overcomes social benefit. These
programs take place in order to increase the votes of the politician in his area.
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and I’ll support yours” (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
Johansson (2003) tested if a tactical effect of Government in distributing
grants to municipalities exists. She empirically studied the preferences in
distributing resources of the government using Swedish data. Her main an-
swer to the question “Are inter-governmental grants tactical or not?” was
yes or it depends (Johansson, 2003). She found, indeed, that transfers are
expected to be larger for the presence of swing vote and low income. This
finding enforces the argument that inter-governmental grants could be used
as pork-barrel from the Government politics.
Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) tested the hypothesis, using Spanish
data, that aligned municipalities receive more grants from the upper-tier gov-
ernments than unaligned ones. They used the difference-in-difference strat-
egy in order to test the alignment effect on allocation of grants from different
sources. They exploited the latter fact using a triple-differences estimator. It
consists in the estimation of the effects of changing the alignment status on
the change in the grants from the aligned grantor compared to the change in
grants from unaligned grantor (Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). They
found that the alignment effect matter in the allocation of grants.
Nannicini and Brollo (2012) documented the existence of tactical behaviour
for the Government in order to punish not aligned politicians using Brazil-
ian data. Their empirical model estimates that mayors who are politically
aligned with the Brazilian President receive larger federal transfers. Tacti-
cal transfers may influence also future election thus making the incumbent
stronger and building an entry barrier for new participants (even if this result
is not so robust). Federal transfers are allocated more for political reasons
than for efficiency and equity (Nannicini and Brollo, 2012).
Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015) provided a political agency
model to test the alignment effect in the allocation of grants. They pointed
on the following features: rational voter interpret public good provision as a
signal of incumbent competence; grants are unobservable to voters (Bracco,
Lockwood, Porcelli, Redoano, 2015). They used a regression discontinuity
design on Italian municipalities data. They found that the alignment effect
exists, so the national government will use the grant as a tool to benefit
the aligned local incumbent and challengers (Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli,
Redoano, 2015). Furthermore, they also test the flypaper effect for Italian
municipalities.
Carozzi and Repetto (2016) tested the existence of pork-barrel politics. They
used the data on Italian municipalities transfers to study if the birth town
of members of Italian Parliament affects the allocation of resources. Specif-
ically, they divided politicians in internal (who have their birthplace within
the district of election) and external (who have not the birthplace within the
15
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district of election). The authors found that municipalities who are connected
to the Parliament by an external politician receive annually approximately
2 percent larger per-capita transfers. So, this effect is driven by politicians
with an electoral district different from the place where they were born. But,
rather than re-election motives11 Carozzi and Repetto observed that legisla-
tors may be pursuing other motives. Moreover, they found that birth town
bias tends to disappear when elections are near (Carozzi and Repetto, 2016).
1.3 Italy: layers of government and fiscal rules
Italy is a fiscally decentralised country with four layers of government: mu-
nicipality, province or metropolitan area (upper-local), region and central
state. These institutions are autonomous from each other, with their statute
(“statuto”), powers and functions defined by the Constitution. There are 20
regional governments (five of which are recognised as autonomous regions,
subject to particular rules) that have important spending responsibilities, for
example, in health care.
Title V of the Italian Constitution regulates the relations between the central
state, region, province, metropolitan area and municipality12.
1.3.1 Municipality
The Italian Constitution13 recognises the municipality as an autonomous en-
tity with its own statutes, powers and functions. In particular, legislative
Decree 267/2000 defines a municipality as a local entity that represents the
community, ensures its interests and encourages its development.
Italy has more than 8,000 municipalities, although most of them are quite
small. Municipalities are multi-purpose government, with legislative power
and their functions are regulated by testo unico degli enti locali (T.U.E.L.).
In general, they must provide services for the community, and guarantee ad-
equate social standards and economic growth. Major expenditure categories
include the classic responsibilities assigned to the local public sector such
11Pork-barrel literature focuses on re-election motives.
12Title V of the Italian Constitution rules local autonomies. It was involved by a series
of reforms since Seventeen in the line of more “fiscal federalism”. In particular, the 2001’s
reform guaranteed to the regions autonomy both in the expenditures and in the organi-
zation of their institutions. Hence, Title V ruled role and competencies of central state,
giving the regions the power to rule on issues that are not competencies of the central
government.
13See from article 114 of the Italian constitution.
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as environmental services, urban planning, public transport, welfare and a
part of educational expenses (for example the care of school buildings). Ex-
penditures are financed by own revenues and by grants, both conditional
and unconditional. Regulation concerning grants should minimise the use of
pork-barrel politics. The grants come from the previously mentioned upper
layers of government: central, regional and upper-local.
Many grants are conditioned by information and projects that municipalities
send to the central government or to the other upper layers of government.
These documents are evaluated according to criteria previously established
by the law, but they can also be affected by the interpretation of the grantor.
Therefore, such grants can be politically discretionary.
Italian municipalities have the following governing bodies14:
• city council (“consiglio comunale”), which has the aim of control and
guidance;
• executive committee (“giunta comunale”), which has “residual juris-
diction” and manages functions that are not managed by other bodies;
• the mayor, who is the executive and representative authority.
The size of the city government and the city council depends on the pop-
ulation. The executive committee provides fiscal policies and it is appointed
by the mayor, who must formulate an annual budget voted on by the council.
Furthermore, local governments are characterised by high political stability,
thanks to the reform of the local electoral system in 1993. The last elec-
toral reform (law 81/1993) allowed the mayor and the legislative body to be
elected directly by the citizens and it contains rules that guarantee a ma-
jority in council and thus political stability. The council can discharge the
mayor, in which case a new election takes place.
The laws differentiate between municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabi-
tants and those with more than 15,000. In the first case the mayor is elected
through a single round-race, and the candidate with more votes wins (i.e. a
plurality voting system); in the second, the mayor is elected by a two-round
system. In the first stage the voters cast two preferences: the mayor and the
party list. The mayor is elected if he receives at least 50 % of voters plus
one. If no one achieves this threshold, the second stage takes place: the vote
is only for the mayor and the two candidates with the most votes run against
each other (Bordignon, Turati, 2014).
14Decree 267/2000.
17
1. Local fiscal policy: the institutional framework
Municipal Budget 15 The already cited T.U.E.L. is the document in
which all rules regarding local entities are gathered. The second part of
this document (article 149-269) contains the budget rules.
Municipalities annually define the expected budget on the basis of accrual
criteria (“criterio di competenza”) and the Economic and Finance Document
(“Documento di Economia e Finanza”). The expected budget cannot be in
deficit and the annual budget lasts from the first of January to the 31st of
December16.
The Executive Committee must define the expected budget, in which the
municipalities forecast their revenues and expenses for the year. The budget
must be presented to the City Council with the relative documents and ap-
proved by the same body no later than the last day17 of the year before the
estimated year. The final budget (“bilancio bonsuntivo or rendiconto della
gestione”), instead, certifies the revenues and expenses actually incurred.
The City Council must approve this document before the 30th of April of
the year following the relevant year.
These two documents are crucial for municipalities’ economies.
1.3.2 Domestic Stability Pact
In 1990, fiscal rules were adopted both at the supra-national and sub-national
levels in order to reduce fiscal imbalances18. After the introduction of the
15The municipal budget regulates economic activity in the municipality. It contains the
revenues and the expenses in the year. For the Italian legislation, the municipal budget is
formed by two documents: “bilancio previsionale” and “bilancio consuntivo”. The former
is an ex-ante document with the aim of political programming and planning. It has an
authoritative function and it contains the expenses expected and the relative revenues that
will fund them.
The “bilancio consuntivo” is the document redacted at the end of the period that allows
the municipality to certificate the revenues effectively collected and expenses effectively
implemented. It has a particular structure. In the “gestione di competenza”, there are
revenues “accertate” and expenses “impegnate”, that are revenues and expenses juridical
chargeable to the financial year but not yet collected or implemented. In the “gestione
di cassa”, there are revenues collected and expenses implemented. The third column
represents the “gestione residui” which, de facto, calculates the difference between the two
voices above.
16The articles from 149 to 269 of T.U.E.L. re-organized the rules contained in Decree
77/1995.
17The deadline of 31st December is mandatory but it may be changed in particular
cases. The change of deadline must be ruled by Interior Minister.
18Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004) describe the evolution of sub-national fiscal rules
in Europe and their relation with Maastricht Treaty. This relation provides the necessity
of coordination and interaction between and within European countries and the necessity
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Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, several European countries adopted the
so-called “Internal Stability Pact” in order to coordinate the central budget
with decentralised ones. In 1999, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) was
introduced in Italy. Its regulation is always defined in the yearly budget law
(“legge finanziaria”). The aim of this pact is to introduce a ceiling in the
increase of the sub-national government’s deficit19 and to coordinate public
finances between the central government and local entities.
Municipal governments committed to keeping their fiscal gaps under con-
trol and those that did not comply the pact were subject to the following
punishment20: 1) a cut of 5 % in grants from the central government, 2)the
prohibition of municipal recruitment, and 3) a cut of 30 % in the resources
designed to fund reimbursement and non-absenteeism bonuses of municipal
employees. Instead, municipalities that followed the pact were eligible for a
reduction in expenses for interests on loans funded by the central government
(Marino, 2013).
In 2001, municipalities with a population less than or equal to 5,000 inhab-
itants were excluded from the commitment of the DSP. From 2002 to 2005,
the Domestic Stability Pact established fiscal targets and constrained current
expenditure.
In 2005, the review of that Pact also involved the constraint on capital ex-
penditure21. In 2006, current and capital expenditures were differentiated,
increasing the latter and thus the investment in the municipality. This rule
was established to improve the efficiency of the local government’s spend-
ing. However, in 2009 this differentiation vanished when the principle of
“mixed competence” (which states that the municipal government can decide
which type of expenditure to cut in order to fulfil the target) was introduced
(Marino, 2013).
In 2013, the DSP was extended to municipalities with a population between
1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. In 2013 approximately 77 % of Italian munici-
palities were subject to the DSP while until 2012 only 30% of municipalities
had been (Marino, 2013).
of defining a central authority for fiscal policies.
19The definition of deficit in the Domestic Stability Pact did not involve health, capital
and interest spending.
20In 2007, there wasn’t the publication of the list of not complying municipalities and
thus the punishment did not occur. This fact generated a contradiction because complying
municipalities were subject to a huge fiscal rigidity while not complying municipalities had
not a punishment. Starting from 2009, punishment and control became more severe.
21The target changed from one year to another even if the structural change had occurred
in 2005 when it passed from a fiscal gap to a financial gap, thus binding the expenses growth
(Marino, 2013).
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1.4 Local public finance: taxes and grants
In order to analyse local public finances we present the mechanisms for munic-
ipal revenue. In particular, municipalities can finance their revenues through
taxation (“finanza propria”) and grants (“finanza derivata”). Article 149 of
the T.U.E.L.22 regulates the local economy and it establishes criteria23 that
must guarantee municipalities’ budget efficiency.
1.4.1 Grants from upper layers of government to mu-
nicipalities
Municipalities receive grants from the central government, the region, the
province and other entities24.
Government grants (“trasferimenti erariali o statali”) are important for the
municipalities’ budgets as they represent one of the main components of mu-
nicipal revenues.
These funds are included into the section of the municipal budget concerning
the second title of revenues.
The amount of resources to transfer as grants is calculated according to cri-
teria established by laws, and thus they are subject to significant change
according to the government in charge. In particular, the budget law (“legge
di stabilita`”) determines the amount of resources to transfer to the munici-
palities.
In general, governments finance municipalities primarily using grants to fund
22T.U.E.L. argues that municipalities can finance their expenses through:
• Local taxes;
• Surtax and revenues sharing from state and regional taxes;
• Taxes for public services;
• Governmental transfers;
• Regional transfers;
• Other municipal revenues and revenues from capital goods;
• Transfers for investment;
• Other revenues.
23It states that local taxation and grants must be founded on the criterion of the cer-
tainty of resources.
24For example municipalities can receive grants from Union of Cities or other inter-
municipal institutions.
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both local current expenditures and capital expenditures25. Grants are allo-
cated according to population (the number of inhabitants of a municipality
is a primary indicator of the resources needed), geography, socio-economic
conditions, fiscal inequality or conditioned to information and projects.
However, Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015) note that Italian
grants are not purely formula-based. Indeed, the political debate of the last
decade has highlighted the need for radical reforms on this point, in order to
move toward formula-based grants.
Local fiscal policy was the subject of many reforms (to improve fiscal auton-
omy) beginning in the early 1990’s. These reforms had the goal of increasing
municipal taxation and thus reducing the dependency of municipalities on
the central State. Increasing the local autonomy for fiscal policy may mean
increasing the accountability of local politicians in setting such policy (Bor-
dignon, Turati, Gramalerio, 2013) and it increases efficiency in spending
behaviours (Boetti, Piacenza, Turati, 2009). However, this autonomy clearly
penalises poorer municipalities, that lack the resources to guarantee the ser-
vices provisions.
The share of grants over total revenues decreased drastically26 because of
25The grants were classified as:
Current transfer:
• ordinary grant (“contributo ordinario”);
• consolidated grant (“contributo consolidato”);
• grant for fiscal inequality (“contributo perequativo degli squilibri della fiscalita` lo-
cale”).
Capital transfer:
• Grant for investments (“contributo per lo sviluppo degli investimenti”);
• ordinary grant for investments (“contributo nazionale ordinario per gli investi-
menti”);
• grant for special investments (“contributo del fondo speciale per gli investimenti”).
The ordinary grant represents the transfer to fund current expenditure. It’s is mainly
calculated using historical data on current expenditure (“criterio della spesa storiaca”).
The consolidated grant is allocated for particular reasons, expected by Interior Minister.
The amount of this grant may be considered more or less constant over time.
The grant for fiscal inequality represents the transfer with the aim to eliminate inequalities
in collected revenues for Italian municipalities. It considers municipality’s fiscal capacity.
Hence, it allocates resources to municipalities with a weak fiscal capacity, thus those
municipalities that are not able to fund the expenditure by their own tax revenues.
26The Italian mechanism of grants was highly centralized. Municipalities had a low fiscal
autonomy and funded their expenditures mainly through government grants. Indeed, over
the eighteen the share of grant over total municipalities revenue was around 80%.
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reforms in 1992 and 1997. This significant decrease showed the rise in mu-
nicipalities’ fiscal autonomy during the 90s and the 2000s. In this context,
in 1999 the Italian Parliament approved the DSP which consisted of a link
between the internal process of fiscal consolidation and the European one.
The DSP, indeed, represents a tool to coordinate public finance between the
government and local entities.
However, the Figure 1.1 shows how the amount of grants rose in 2008 de-
spite a drop of municipal taxation. This change of direction was due to the
abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
Besides the central state, other layers of government can transfer resources
to municipalities to fund municipal expenditures.
As stated above, the regional and upper-local grants are also included in the
second title of the revenues side of the municipal budget.
Regional parliaments also regulate the discipline related to the distribution of
grants. Regional grants can finance both current expenditures and capital ex-
penditures. The resources that regions transfer to municipalities are added to
the local budget on the revenues side as “grant from region” (which finances
current expenditures) and “capital transfer from region” (which primarly fi-
nances investments). In particular, regions fund local capital expenditures
through grants conditioned to projects.
The same occurs with the transfers from provinces or other public adminis-
trations.
1.4.2 Municipal taxation
Over time municipalities gained significant fiscal autonomy. Many reforms
involved the possibility of creating new taxes with the aim of guaranteeing
budget sustainability in terms of local revenues. For this reason during the
2000s local taxes assumed a crucial role in municipal budgets27.
In the following section, we limit ourselves describing only local taxes
related to our analysis.
Property tax (“Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili, I.C.I.”) In 1992,
Amato’s government introduced a property tax on dwelling called the I.C.I.
(“Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili”)28. This tax was applied on all build-
ings (residential or not residential) and lands. For the first time, Italian
municipalities had a strong fiscal instrument that guaranteed greater auton-
27They are enrolled at I Title of the revenues side in the final budget.
28Law 504/1992.
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Figure 1.1: Per-capita total grant vs per-capita municipal taxes.
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of per capita total grant and per capita established municipal taxes
from 2004 to 2010. It describes a fall in revenues from total municipal taxation starting from 2008.
Source: Interior Minister (Finanza Locale).
omy into raising revenues. The tax base was the same for all municipalities
and ruled by Italian national Cadastre. However, municipalities set the tax
rate and discount. The tax rate had ranged between 0.4 and 0.7 % and
according to residential or commercial buildings. In addition, municipalities
could adopt discounts for residential buildings. Obviously, in 2008 with the
abolition of this tax, revenues were significantly reduced. Correspondingly,
the grants from the government to local administrations increased in such a
way that municipalities could manage the same amount of resources (that is
the amount no longer collected on the main dwelling) after the property tax
reform.
At that time, indeed, the property tax on the main dwelling was the most
cited tax in political debates29. In 2007 the centre-left government applied
a reduction to the main dwelling, subsequently, the centre-right government
in 2008 abolished the property tax on the main dwelling, as promised in the
electoral campaign.
The property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling represented one of the main
29The political debate on this tax was intense: who pointed on tax free status of the
main dwelling and who pointed on the importance of this tax for local revenues.
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sources of local finance and its importance is highlighted by the fact that
it also represented around 50% of municipal taxation (Nannicini, Grembi,
Troiano, 2016). In addition, mayors may rule on it according to their politi-
cal sensibility.
Of consequence, after 2008 the share of this tax declined despite an increase
in governmental grants.
In addition, the abolition of the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling
led to the question of how much the refund should have been. However,
the amount of resources funded by the central government was less than the
property tax on the main dwelling collected in 2007. Thus, in the allocation
of grants some municipalities may have gained an “extra-resource” while oth-
ers may have lost revenues.
Tax on waste (“Tassa per lo smaltimento dei rifuti solidi urbani,
T.A.R.S.U.”) Municipalities also have environmental responsibility30 and
must adopt rules to preserve it according to the principles of transparency,
efficiency and effectiveness.
The tax on waste (T.A.R.S.U.)31 was a municipal tax that must fund the cost
of waste disposal. Not all types of waste, however, were the object of this
tax. Private producers specifically must fund the disposal of highly polluting
waste. At that time, the taxation was related to the occupation of space in
the municipality in which the service is provided. This tax, except in munici-
palities with a population of fewer than 35,000 inhabitants, was proportional
not to the quantity of waste produced but to the size of the occupied space.
This characteristic made this de facto a tax on capital instead of a tax on a
service. Furthermore, the law stated that municipalities must organise the
tax through a dedicated regulation.
In order to create a tax on waste closely related to the service provided,
in 1997 the centre-left government introduced a new tax the “tariffa per
l’igiene ambientale ”with the aim to substitute the T.A.R.S.U. However both
taxes remained in the municipal fiscal scenario. Each municipality could
choose which to apply but the majority of Italian municipalities preferred
the T.A.R.S.U..
The dimension of the dwelling represented the base of this tax and it is
considered linked to the waste yield32. Where highly applied, this tax repre-
30Waste services are ruled by the Environment Code (“Codice dell’ambiente”), legisla-
tive decree 152/2006.
31Legislative decree n. 507/1993.
32Several Italian municipalities have not a correct methodology to calculate as well the
waste yield.
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sented approximately 20% of the municipal taxation. After the property tax
and the IRPEF surcharge, it may be considered one of the most important
source of municipal taxation.
In 2008, following the law abolishing the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main
dwelling, Berlusconi’s government ruled also ruled on local fiscal policy. In
particular, local fiscal policy was regulated by article 77-bis legislative decree
n. 122, 2008. This article states that “it is established for 2009-2011 the
prohibition for the local autonomies of increasing the local taxation with the
exception of the tax on waste”33.
In sum, the T.A.R.S.U. was the only tax that could easily be increased in
cases of fiscal necessity.
Building permits (“permessi a costrure”) The municipality regulates
construction activity and in order to fulfill this task, it must adopt building
rules (“regolamento edilizio”) which includes issuing building permits.
The building permit34 is an official document issued by the municipality in
order to authorise building activity in accordance with the related regulation.
In general, this authorisation involves both new building and restructuring
activities.
First the building permit must be requested towards the payment of a cer-
tain amount of money (“oneri concessori”) and the production of specific
documents. The legislative side is ruled by a specific regulation (“testo unico
dell’edilizia”) and by regional laws.
Before 2004, the so-called “Bucalossi”35 law ruled building permits. This
law required that the revenues from building permits would have been used
to finance infrastructures in the municipality. In 2004, the obligation to use
these revenues to fund capital expenditure was relaxed and they could in-
stead be used to finance part of the current expenditures at a maximum of
75%36(Ermini, Fiorillo and Santolini, 2013).
The effect of this law was notable. As consequence, 2004 saw an increase in
the share of the revenues from building permits over total revenues37. How-
33This prohibition was lowered by the Court of Auditors. Indeed, the Court stated
that the prohibition to increase local taxation must not involve those municipalities that
included this increase in their expected budget. This is the reason why some local taxes
increased during 2009-2011.
34Building permits are mainly regulated by the Presidential Decree no. 380/2001. De-
cree unified and organized laws and rules regarding the building activity from 1942 to
2001.
35Law 10/1977.
36Law 311/2004.
37The data are not representative of all Italian municipalities. Some municipalities do
not send their budget to the Interior Minister for the publication or simply put 0 at the
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ever, the law of 2004 and subsequent ones38 incentivised land consumption
in order to increase revenues and thus the local expenditure.
1.5 Property tax reform: the abolition of main
dwelling property tax (I.C.I.)
1.5.1 Political environment
The abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling was introduced in the
political debate during the electoral race in 2006; it was proposed by Silvio
Berlusconi, the leader of the centre-right coalition House of Freedom (“Casa
delle liberta`”). The centre-left coalition the Union (“L’Unione”), led by Ro-
mano Prodi, won the election with a restricted majority. In 2007 Prodi’s
government reformed the property tax. In particular, it regulated a reduc-
tion in the property tax on the main dwelling. In 2008, after the crisis of
the Prodi government, a new election was held. The centre-right coalition
was formed by two parties, “Popolo della Liberta`” and “Lega Nord” while
the centre-left coalition was formed by “Partito Democratico” and “Italia dei
valori”. The electoral race involved these two coalitions as well as a a third
formed by a centre party, “Unione di Centro”. The centre-right coalition
won the election with a strong majority and one of the first acts of Berlus-
coni’s government was the abolition of the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main
dwelling.
In general, the political environment in Italy is characterised by the presence
of a large number of parties. In 2008, at the sub-national level the coalitions
were wider than at the national level. In particular, they were composed of
political parties and civic parties39 and their composition did not necessarily
reflect the coalitions at the national level.
In addition, Italy has different electoral rules for different layers of govern-
ment. The electoral rules at the city, provincial and regional levels guarantee
higher stability than the national level and governments at sub-national lev-
els have higher probability to be in charge longer than the central government.
voice in the local budget concerning building permits.
38Law 244/2007 and 2016 Budget Law.
39Civic parties are difficult to be identified along the ideological line.
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1.5.2 The abolition of main dwelling property tax
The debate about the abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling
began in earnest during the electoral campaign in 2006. Next, Prodi’s gov-
ernment decreased this tax, increasing deductions for the main dwelling40
and financing transfers to municipalities for 904 millions of euros. Subse-
quently, Berlusconi’s government issued the abolition of the property tax on
the main dwelling41. Transfers for 1,700 millions of euros substituted the
amount of the uncollected tax which was added to 904 millions of euros
funded by Prodi’s government. However, transfers increased during the year
of the property tax reform (Table 1.1).
In addition, the law stated that the state-municipalities and local entities
conference (“Conferenza Stato-citta` and enti locali”) needed to decide the
criteria and methods to regulate the amount of the transfers allocated to
municipalities. In order to avoid problems with municipalities’ accountabil-
ity, the decree of June 2008 provided the transfer to the municipalities of
50% of the property tax collected for the main dwelling in 2007.
For 2008, the Interior Minister planned the amount to be transferred as fol-
lows:
• July 7, 2008, 50% of the tax revenues, certified, on the main dwelling
for 2007;
• December 12, 2008, approximately 36% of the tax revenues, certified,
on the main dwelling for 2007;
• December 13, 2008, the difference up to 94,75% of the tax revenues
that was certified on the main dwelling for 200742.
In order to define the amount to transfer to each municipality, the law reg-
ulated the duty of certifying the revenues of the property tax on the main
dwelling no longer collected in 2008.
The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Economy and Finance col-
lected data on 2007, using also information from the Italian Post Office (Poste
Italiane s.p.a.).
Institutions with control goal43 was the Court of Auditors (“Corte dei Conti”).
The fundamental issue of refunding the municipalities for the revenues no
longer collected returned in 200944.
40Law n. 244 of 2006 Budget Law.
41Law n. 126/2008.
42Data are collected by Interior Minister.
43Decree n.154/2008, subparagraph 6 and 7, and it subsequently converted into law n.
189/2008.
44For 2009, Interior Minister planned the amount to be transferred as follows:
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Table 1.1: Total amount of certificated main dwelling property tax and the
following grant allocated by government, in million of euros.
2008 2009 2010
Fund Allocated 2,864 2,604 2,604
Fund Increase 156 760 760
Total Fund Allocated 3,020 3,364 3,364
I.C.I. Certificated at 2008 3,364.6 3,364.6 3,364.6
Percent coverage 0.898 0.998 0.998
Note: Table shows data on amount (in million of euros), certificated by the Interior Minister, of the
main dwelling property tax and total amount of compensatory grant allocated by central government.
Source: Interior Minister.
1.5.3 The control system: the role of the Court of Au-
ditors (“Corte dei Conti”)
The Minister of the Interior entrusted the Court of Auditors (“Corte dei
Conti”) with control of the truthfulness of the data transmitted. To provide
this aim, the Court of Auditors could be assisted by another institution, the
Territorial Agency.
However, the Court of Auditors45 encountered difficulties in testing the truth-
fulness of the data transmitted by the municipalities to the Minister of In-
terior. For this reason, the institution tasked with control preferred to sub-
stitute the term “truthfulness” with the term “reliability”. In particular,
the regional sections of the Court of Auditors were responsible for defining
criteria and methodology to verify “reliability”. Indeed, this control was im-
plemented according to these parameters. However if data were considered
unreliable, there was no punishment for the municipality; in this case, the
municipality had only the duty of recalculating the amount of the property
tax on the main dwelling no longer collected.
As stated above, the content of the approval showed the difficulty of control
and thus, in the definition of the truthfulness of the data. These difficulties
may make the issue of defining the amount of transfers to each municipality
complex to be implemented. In addition uncertainty in controlling the data
and the absence of a punishment may increase the moral hazard for munici-
• 15 June 2009, 50% of the revenues from main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.) that
were certificated in 2007;
• 27 November 2009, transfers based on 2008 data;
• 7 December 2009, transfers based on 2008 data.
45Deliberation n. 8/2009 by Court of Auditors.
28
1.5 Property tax reform: the abolition of main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.)
Figure 1.2: Total amount of compensative grant and revenues from property
tax collected in 2007 and in 2008.
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The graph compares the total amount of compensatory grant in 2008 with the total amount of revenues
from the main dwelling property tax collected in 2007 and 2008. The grant was allocated according to
the revenues of the main dwelling property tax collected in 2007.
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Figure 1.3: Total amount of compensative grant, 2008-2010.
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The figure shows the evolution of the total amount of compensatory grant (in million of euros) from
2008 to 2010.
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In this scenario, institutions asked with control and monitoring could have
discretionary power in deciding which municipality tells the truth and which
does not. However, it is not possible to suppose that the Court of Audi-
tors could use its power for political aims. First, the Court of Auditors is a
“super-partes” institution.
Second, the law establishing its role as first-step controller for the reliability
of the data does not leave room for discretionary power: the Court of Audi-
tors decides the criteria and parameters to test the data of all municipalities.
However, the complexity in controlling the reliability of the data remains as
it is possible that untrue data could be considered reliable. In order to min-
imise errors in this evaluation, the Minister of the Interior developed several
indicators in order to implement a second-step control. As consequence, data
that violated those indicators could be subject to a check.
1.5.4 Mechanism of grant allocation: the role of State-
municipalities, the local entities Conference (“Con-
ferenza Stato-citta` ed autonomie locali”) and the
Interior Minister
The Interior Minister and the state-municipalities and local entities confer-
ence46 were two important actors in the debate concerning the abolition of
the property tax on the main dwelling. After providing the abolition of the
main dwelling property tax in early 2008, the government met political repre-
sentatives of municipalities to discuss the criteria to adopt for the reallocation
of resources no longer collected.
The conference, which took place in June 2008, stated that the grants must
be calculated on the amount certified by the Interior Minister (according to
DM February 15th, 2008) and collected (“riscosso”) of the property tax on
the main dwelling in 2007.
In addition, it became necessary to establish criteria for an efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
These criteria were established in the conference that took place on August
5th 2008. One of the parameters the conference chose and that was adopted
by the government concerned efficiency in the property tax collection. It was
defined as the ratio between the amounts collected in both “conto compe-
46The State-municipalities and local entities Conference is an institution with the aim
of coordination, research, gathering information and debate about policies that may affect
Italian municipalities. It can debate about issues related to the local budget and thus it
represented a good laboratory in which to discuss problems related to the abolition of the
main dwelling property tax.
31
1. Local fiscal policy: the institutional framework
tenza” and “conto residui” (the amount effectively collected) for the period
2004-2006 and the “accertamenti” (the amount expected and so established)
of the same tax for the same period. Data used to build this parameter in-
cluded those sent from municipalities to the Interior Minister.
The same conference also defined other parameters such as the respect of the
DSP and the characteristics of the municipality proxies by population size.
For the definition of the last parameter, the municipalities under considera-
tion were those with a population less than or equal to 5,000 inhabitants.
Compliance with the parameters discussed above led to a score for each mu-
nicipality:
• municipalities with a parameter of efficiency in the property tax col-
lection greater than 4% of the national average level scores 1; between
4% and -4% scores zero; less than -4% scores -1.
• Municipalities that comply the DSP gain one point; municipalities that
do not comply the Domestic Stability Pact gain zero points;
• Municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants gain one point; mu-
nicipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants gain zero points.
In the end, the Minister can assign to the municipalities a score that ranges
between -2 and 247. These percentages are applied to the amount of taxes
not collected and certified by the municipalities. The non-allocated amount
caused by a negative score resulted in the creation of a special fund designed
for municipalities with a population less than 5,000 inhabitants.
The criteria for 200948 remained, approximately, the same as those ruled by
the decree of the Interior Minister on August 200849.
47The decree of Interior Minister n. 216/2008 regulated, at article 2, the percentage of
the reduction in grants according to the following criteria:
• 4% less for municipalities with a score of -2;
• 2,5% less for municipalities with a score of -1;
• 1% less for municipalities with a score of 0.
48The Conference was held in September 2009.
49It established, among other things, the percentage of reduction in grants according to
the following criteria:
• 1,8% less for municipalities with a score of -2;
• 1,1% less for municipalities with a score of -1;
• 0,4% less for municipalities with a score of 0.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of local public finance and the rules regu-
lating the abolition of the property tax on main dwelling. In particular, we
are interested in the weakness of the law on the property tax abolition that,
in this case, may be the cause of discretionary policies by the government
in the allocation of transfers. The previous sections show the complexity of
collecting data, choosing the criteria for allocation and in control. Indeed,
laws and regulations faced the constraint of regulating an alternative source
of funding as soon as possible. In this scenario, the allocation of resources no
longer collected may decline in efficiency and the municipality’s moral hazard
about data communication may arise. The assignment of data control to the
Court of Auditors overcharged this institution’s role, while the second-step
control of the Interior Minister may be politically biased.
We have also described some aspects of municipal revenues and laws es-
tablished by the central government that can affect local fiscal policy. The
abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling increased uncertainty in
local public finance. Thus the uncertainty on data and on the amount of
resources calculated for the compensation of the tax abolition caused un-
certainty in local budgets: municipalities could expect a loss in revenues, if
the amount of resources transferred was lower than the amount of property
tax no longer collected, or a gain if the amount of resources transferred was
greater than the amount of property tax no longer collected. Local govern-
ments could set their fiscal policy according to what they expected to be
the grant: politicians could increase, reduce or let the revenues and/or the
expenses remain constant.
The property tax reform represents an experiment to investigate the be-
haviour of Italian municipalities as a response, although low in degree, to
fiscal centralization. In particular, Italian municipalities follow tight fiscal
rules (i.e. the DSP) promoted to efficiently manage resources and to reduce
the debt of public administrations. Deviation from the target causes penal-
ties in terms of grants transferred from the government to the municipalities
(or fines) and may paint a politician in a negative light reducing his chances
of being re-elected. This fear of a loss may influence the municipal politician
to increase revenues more than necessary or cut expenses more than neces-
sary to avoid fiscal imbalances.
On the other hand, the abolition of the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main
dwelling represented a useful political instrument to win elections. Indeed,
the median voter in Italy is a homeowner and is thus influenced by this pol-
icy. In addition, the abolition led to an increase in the amount of grants
from the centre to the municipalities, as well as a decrease in fiscal auton-
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omy. In this sense, Italian municipalities became more dependent on central
grants and the government had more leeway for pork-barrel policies. In brief,
the negative side of the legislation may allow for partisan alignment effects:
politicians in the government may pursue the strategy of allocating more
resources to the mayors politically linked to them. Thus, this strategy may
provide the possibility that politicians of the majority maintain and even
increase their votes.
In conclusion, our goal may be summarised as follows:
1. Analysing the behaviour of fiscal policy for the municipalities as a re-
action to the uncertainty caused by the property tax reform;
2. Testing whether the government adopted a pork-barrel strategy for the
distribution of grants following the abolition of the property tax on the
main dwelling.
The PhD thesis is organised as follows: in chapter 2 we analyse the be-
haviour of Italian municipalities as a response to the abolition of the main
dwelling property tax; in chapter 3 we test the presence of the “partisan
effect”.
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Analysis on the
Fiscal Behaviour of Italian
Municipalities
2.1 Introduction
The 2008 fiscal reform ruled the abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
This tax represents one of the most important source of revenues for Italian
municipalities and its partial abolition decreased the room for local fiscal
policy. Municipalities lost this fiscal instrument that was substituted by gov-
ernmental grants. This fiscal phenomenon moved the Italian system towards
a centralization, after years of a fiscal decentralization(“federalismo fiscale”)
process.
The abolition of the main dwelling property tax led two effects to the local
political economy. On one hand, the substitution of a local tax by a govern-
mental transfer decreased the political cost, in terms of votes, of the increase
in local taxes, because local politicians were no longer politically responsible
of the property tax on the main dwelling. Indeed, with the reduction of fiscal
autonomy the cost of raising is largely borne by non-resident, and so local
politicians have a clear tendency to free-ride against each other (Bordignon,
2000)1. Hence, local governments may be encouraged in increasing local tax-
ation to obtain political rents.
On the other hand, local politicians could decide to increase local taxes to
1The Italian case also suggest that the removal of vertical fiscal imbalance alone is
not enough to eliminate the incentives to overspend at local level. Larger autonomy
at the regional level in the health sector and a law that explicitly prohibiting the central
government from eventually sustaining local bills were not enough to enforce a hard budget
at regional level (Bordignon, 2000).
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face budget imbalances. Indeed, the loss of revenues due to the abolition of
main dwelling property tax was not always totally compensated by govern-
mental grants. These two effects, political rents and fiscal balances motives,
may rise local taxation.
For the reasons stated above, the Italian government prohibited by law the
opportunity to increase municipal taxation from 2008 to 2011. However, this
fiscal measure was “relaxed”, when the central government allowed, with an-
other law2, the variation of the waste tax (“T.A.R.S.U.”). As a consequence,
in 2009 the “accertata” waste tax in per-capita terms was in mean 93.5 euros
while it was 88.4 euros in 2008.
In this chapter we want to test whether or not the behaviour of municipalities
in terms of revenues may change according to the grant received to compen-
sate the abolition of the tax on the main dwelling (Imposta Comunale sugli
Immobili, I.C.I.). On the other hand, we also want to test whether the mu-
nicipalities fix or not the local expenditure according to the grant received
to compensate the abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
Furthermore, we also investigate whether or not the fiscal centralization pro-
cess induce local politicians to behave differently according to the received
grant. Indeed, the uncertainty on the data on the main dwelling property tax
in 2007 may affect the amount of compensation in 2008. As a matter of fact,
in 2008 some municipalities may receive more than the amount collected for
the main dwelling in 2007 and some municipalities may receive less.
As stated before, the fiscal uncertainty generated by the reform may affect
fiscal behaviour of local governments. Indeed, uncertainty may lead munici-
palities towards two states of nature:
1. the “good” state occurred when the municipality manages more re-
sources after the property tax reform;
2. the “bad” state occurred when the municipality manages less resources
after the property tax reform.
The position on the “bad” state may generate problems in terms of budget
balance3: receiving less money than collected in 2007 decreased the revenues
and it may lead to low budget unbalance. Therefore, the reform generated
2The article 77-bis legislative decree n. 133/2008. The comma was eliminated by law
n. 44/2012.
3The amount of resources subject to our analysis may generate weak budget difficul-
ties. However, the reduction of resources following the reform and the constant decrease
of grants from the central government to the municipalities may exacerbate these fiscal
difficulties.
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worse off municipalities. Obviously, local governments may intervene increas-
ing local taxation, in particular the waste tax4, to compensate the loss5.
On the contrary, the position on the “good” state may generate extra-
resources that can fund reduction in tax or increase in spending. Therefore,
the reform generated better off municipalities.
In 2009 Salerno, for example, raised the “accertata” per-capita waste tax of
more than 14 euros compared to 2008 against a net loss from the property
tax abolition of less than 8 euros per-capita. On other hand and for the
same reasons, municipalities that expected a gain in terms of revenues after
the property tax abolition (better off municipalities) may have decided to
decrease the rate of the waste tax or increase it for funding a further increase
in the expenses. In 2009 Pavia, for example, decreased the “accertata” per-
capita waste tax of more than 3 euros compared to 2008 against a net gain
from the property tax abolition of more than 15 euros per-capita6. In the
same year, Bologna raised the per-capita waste tax of approximately 7 euros
compared to 2008 against a net gain of more than 15 euros per-capita.
Italian cities cited in the examples show a likely different behaviour of local
politicians according to be in the “good” or “bad” scenario. Politicians that
experienced a gain in revenues (Pavia or Bologna’s cases) may have decided
to reduce as well as increase the waste tax less than the degree of a cer-
tain gain. On the contrary, politicians that experienced a loss in revenues
(Salerno’s case) may have decided to increase the waste tax more than the
municipalities in the gain side.
Thus, we may expect two different behaviours between local politicians in
better off and worse off municipalities. Politicians in “bad” scenario increased
the taxes while politicians in the “good” one did not set taxes according to
the gain. In particular, politicians in “good” state could have used the extra-
resources to reduce local taxes. They could have also increased the waste tax
and used the extra-resources from the grant and the additional revenues from
the waste tax to gain political rents. Hence, the substitution between mu-
nicipal tax and governmental grant may rise the opportunistic behaviour for
local politicians in line with soft budget literature (Bordignon, Turati and
4Note that the waste tax revenues cannot overcome the total cost of waste disposal
service. However, Italian waste service cannot establish the certain amount of the cost for
that service.
5This fiscal tool is particularly expensive for local politicians. The increase in taxation,
indeed, may be seen by citizens as a bad policy and this will be translated in a punishment
in terms of votes in the electoral race. Hence, the 2008 fiscal reform reduced this political
cost.
6These mean values are calculated on data of around 6,700 Italian municipalities in
ordinary regions.
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Gramalerio, 2013).
However not all politicians may be moved by opportunistic motives and thus
have the same fiscal behaviour. Indeed, the worse off local governments in-
crease more the waste tax than the better off government maybe because
they fear a loss in revenues. Indeed, the waste tax increase for worse off
municipalities was in line with the degree of loss.
The waste tax increase is not the only fiscal tool in the municipal economic
policy. One of the voices that had an increasing attention in the municipal
budget is the revenues from the building permits. In times of huge grants cut
and greater autonomy of local fiscal policy, municipalities looked for other
instruments in order to increase the revenues side. Indeed, literature on the
argument highlights how, in the scenario of a shortage of resources and the
increasing demand for local services, Italian municipalities rose the number
of building permits for rising the revenues related to them. In addition,
laws relaxing the spending use of the revenues from the building permits7
led them to be considered close substitutes of local taxes (Ermini, Fiorillo
and Santolini, 2013). It occurred, mostly, after that the Italian law allowed
the revenues from the building permits to fund also the current expenditure,
even if only for a given percentage.
Hence, looking to the recent literature on local fiscal policy, we include in
our analysis also revenues from issuing the building permits. As stated be-
fore, these revenues may be considered substitute of local taxes and their
use, especially in budget stress periods, could be fundamental. In our frame-
work, municipal governments may use revenues from building permits to
compensate the loss of revenues and to increase the number of dwellings (in
particular the second dwellings) that will be taxed in the future. The dark
side of this fiscal tool is represented by the high environment cost related to
land consumption. Thus, the short-run benefit in terms of more resources
must face the long-run environmental costs.
We extend our analysis also to the current expenditure. Indeed, the re-
duction of resources in revenues may be compensated by a reduction in the
expenditure side. But reducing the expenses may have high social costs, es-
pecially because municipalities must guarantee essential services. However,
it remains not inconceivable to assume that a fear of a loss of money due to
the property tax reform, may lead to a cut in the current expenditure, while
an expected extra-revenue could lead to an increase in the current expendi-
ture.
This chapter attempts to investigate the following issues:
7See national law: 311/2004 (art. 1, comma 43), 296/2006 (art. 1, comma 713),
244/2007 (art. 2, comma 8) and recently 10/2011 (art. 2, comma 41).
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1. whether or not municipalities increased revenues subsequent to a loss
following the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling abolition,
2. whether or not municipalities decreased the current expenditure subse-
quent to a loss following the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling
abolition,
3. whether or not “losers” municipalities behaved differently from “win-
ners” municipalities in terms of revenues and/or expenditure change.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2 we discuss about the
institutional framework and the data of our analysis; in section 2.3 we discuss
about the theory behind the empirical model used for our analysis; in section
2.4 we discuss the empirical model; in 2.5 we show the estimation results; in
section 2.6 we operate the robustness check analysis and the conclusion.
2.2 Institutional Framework and Data
In the following paragraphs we briefly describe the institutional framework
of our analysis8. We describe in more details the data that we use in our
empirical model.
2.2.1 The Institutional Framework
Municipalities are the layer of government our analysis considers. There are
two main sources of fund collection for municipalities:
• Municipal taxation mainly used to fund services that municipalities
implement for citizens.
• In general, grants from governments, regions and provinces.
We now turn to the revenues side. The property tax (I.C.I.) has always been
an important source of revenues for municipalities. It was reformed in 2008
and this reform led to the abolition of the tax. Other sources of interest
are the waste tax and revenues from building permits. Indeed, our analysis
involves not only the tax on the main dwelling, but also the waste tax and
the building permits. In particular:
8For a more detailed description see 1st Chapter.
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• the waste tax (“Tassa per lo Smaltimento dei Rifiuti Solidi Urbani,
T.A.R.S.U.”)9 is applied by the municipalities and formally represents
a tax related to the waste services. It must satisfy some parameters
such as the cost of waste disposal, the size of the dwelling and the
economic activity implemented in the dwelling subject to this tax;
• the property tax (“Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili, I.C.I.”)10 is one
of the main sources of funding in a municipality and is applied to its
dwellings, buildings and lands. After its abolition, the I.C.I. was sub-
stituted by the IMU (“Imposta Municipale propria”)11, ruled in 2012
by Monti’s government;
• the building permit is an official document issued by the municipality
in order to authorise building activity in accordance with the related
regulation. In general, this authorisation involves both the new build-
ing and restructuring activities. The revenues from issuing building
permits can be used to fund both current and capital expenditures.
In 2008 Berlusconi’s government decided to abolish the property tax (I.C.I.)
on the main dwelling. The abolition did not concern all dwellings; for ex-
ample it excluded luxury houses12. Furthermore, the government prohibited
regions, provinces and municipalities from increasing taxation between 2009
and 201113. The local governments thus were highly limited in their fiscal
policy.
All of these measures could have negatively affected the municipal budget,
especially for those municipalities that experienced a progressive reduction
of their resources during time.
Furthermore, 2008 was known as the year in which the “Great Recession” be-
gan. Berlusconi’s government had serious problems facing the crisis, which
is why the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano assigned Professor Mario
Monti the burden of forming a new government that could lead Italy out of
the crisis. This new government, in power from 2011 to 2013, implemented
significant austerity measures that involved all layers of government. These
measures had the aim of reducing the central budget deficit. In particular,
at that time municipalities suffered further cut in grants.
The additional commitment to fiscal rules, the need to guarantee the main-
tenance of services at a minimum standard level during the crisis and the
9Legislative decree n. 507/1993.
10Legislative decree n. 504/1992.
11Legislative decree n. 23/2011.
12The categories are ruled by Italian Cadastre.
13The law n. 133/2008.
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progressive cuts to local entities exacerbated stress on the municipal bud-
gets.
2.2.2 The Data
Italian data are available on different platforms. For our analysis, we have
combined data from many sources. The data source for the amount of rev-
enues from the property tax (“I.C.I.”), waste tax (“T.A.R.S.U.”), revenues
from building permits (“permessi a costruire”) and current expenditures is
the “Certificati Consuntivi di Bilancio”. The Italian Interior Ministry pro-
vides this data-set online. All others variables or statistics were obtained
from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
We do not analyse the totality of the Italian municipalities, but only those
belonging to Italian regions that do not have the autonomous status. We
have excluded these municipalities because of their fiscal advantages. Our
analysis is thus restricted to municipalities in 15 Italian ordinary statute
regions (“regioni a Statuto Ordinario”): Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Lig-
uria, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Lazio, Molise,
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria.
As stated above, the data on the municipal budgets14 were collected from
the Interior Minister web-site, from the section dedicated to the municipal
finance (“Finanza Locale”).
We used data on waste taxation, building permits, property tax (I.C.I.) on
the main dwelling and current expenditures. Municipalities’ balance sheets,
on the revenues side, consist of three columns: “Accertamenti”, “Riscossioni
in conto Competenza” and “Riscossioni in conto Residui”. Then, we use data
from each column.
The data on compensatory grants for the abolition of the property tax on the
main dwelling (“Trasferimenti compensativi minori introiti I.C.I. abitazione
14Municipal budget regulates local economic activity. It contains revenues and expenses
accountable in a year. It is composed by two main documents: the estimated budget
(“bilancio previsionale”) and the final budget (“bilancio consuntivo”). The former is
an ex-ante document with the aim of political programming and planning. It has an
authorization function and it contains the expected expenses and revenues. The “bilancio
consuntivo” is a document redacted at the end of the period and it allows municipalities
to certificate the revenues effectively collected and expenses effectively implemented. It
has a particular structure. In the “gestione di competenza” there are revenues “accertate”
and expenses “impegnate”, that are revenues and expenses juridical chargeable to that
financial year but not effectively collectable or implementable. In the “gestione di cassa”
there are collected revenues and implemented expenses. The third part represents the
“gestione residui” which de facto calculates the difference between the two voices above.
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principale”) are contained in the section dedicated to governmental grants15.
These data are included in the main section of “other grants” (“Altri con-
tributi generali”). They represent the amount of money that the government,
under the Interior Minister, decided to transfer to the municipalities to com-
pensate the abolition of the property tax on the main dwelling.
It is necessary to highlight that the data collected on municipal budget
presents some weaknesses. For example, there are municipalities that do
not communicate their budgets or that do not communicate the true values
expressed into their budgets. There are municipalities that set the amount of
some values in the revenues to zero, even when this is not the true amount.
Obviously, this must be taken into consideration since our analysis is based
primarily on these data. However, not all the zeros should be considered miss-
ing values because there could be municipalities that have enough resources
to choose to eliminate a particular municipal tax, especially for political rea-
sons. However, since declaring the amount of some values in the “Bilancio
Consuntivo” (shown on the Interior Minister’s web-site) is not mandatory
for the municipalities, we can assume that, most likely, some zeros may be
not accurate data.
Several variables are treated in per-capita terms. Data on Italian population
were collected from the web-site of ISTAT in the demographic section.
2.3 Theory behind the empirical model
2.3.1 The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
The RDD is a quasi-experimental method. Its major use is studying the
impact of a policy around a cut-off. It allows analysis of observations on
both sides of the reference point and captures differences or analogies: ob-
servations just above the threshold are considered similar to observation just
below the threshold. This method was first introduced, by Thistlewaite and
Campbell (1960). The researchers Lee and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and
Lemieux (2008), and Cook (2008) have provided reviews of the method and
they worked to improve it.
The main advantages of the RDD are the weaker assumptions needed for
its validity compared to other non-experimental impact evaluation methods.
However one limitation of this approach is that, because the impact of the
15The Interior Minister web-site has a section “Trasferimenti erariali e Attribuzioni di
entrata da federalismo fiscale delle amministrazioni provinciali, nonche` attribuzione da
fondo di solidariet comunale e contributi per i comuni” in which are collected data on
grants from central government to municipalities.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
1 2 3 4
Tarsu2009 Tarsu2008 Tarsu2009 Tarsu2008
p1 0 0 0.1115947 0.1196159
p5 0 0 9.079197 11.00483
p10 0 0 53.50593 50.28624
p25 62.72385 59.55059 73.04117 68.96069
p50 89.68059 84.32856 94.98754 89.54439
p75 119.177 112.3594 123.9235 116.5387
p90 160.3434 150.2434 165.4025 157.0129
p95 196.5185 186.1862 205.88 191.8956
p99 331.8708 319.8499 344 325.2356
Mean 93.48102 88.47558 105.2547 99.47927
N observations 6,687 6,690 5,939 5,950
The table shows descriptive statistics for the established per-capita waste tax in 2008 and 2009.
Columns 1 and 2 describe summary statistic when we leave 0 in the waste tax observations; columns
3 and 4 describe summary statistic when we replace 0 in the waste tax observations by missing values.
policy is estimated locally at the threshold, it is difficult to generalise the
RDD estimated effect results.
The RDD is defined as an estimation of whether or not the outcome variable
exhibits a jump at the threshold of the rating variable. The magnitude of
the jump can be estimated in two ways: by using all the observations in the
sample or by using a local regression that reduces the observation to a band-
width around the threshold of the rating variable, in which the functional
form is most likely linear (Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012). There are
two types of strategies for specifying the functional form of the single-rating
RD case (Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012):
• Parametric approach: this approach uses all the observations in the
sample to build the outcome as a function of the treatment and the
rating variable.
• Nonparametric approach: this approach uses the observations in the
sample close to the cut-point, called bandwidth, where the functional
form is more likely to be linear.
The main issue with the last approach is how to choose the right bandwidth,
which may be chosen arbitrarily in the following ways:
• by looking to the distribution of the rating variable;
• by applying methods that exist in the related literature.
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When the analyst must choose between parametric and nonparametric anal-
ysis, he must keep in mind the trade-off between the two different strategies.
The parametric approach, using all the observations in the sample, can offer
greater precision than the nonparametric approach. On the other hand, the
nonparametric method reduces the chances that bias will be introduced16.
The caveat of this approach, however, is that nonparametric analysis has
a more limited statistical power due to a smaller number of observations
involved into the analysis.
2.3.2 The Regression Kink Design (RK Design)
An extension of this approach is the regression kink design (RKD). The
idea behind regression discontinuity is an increase in the likelihood of being
treated at a certain reference point. Similarly in the kink design there is a
change in the slope at the likelihood of being treated at a certain point. So,
instead of a jump in the variable, we expect a jump in the first derivative.
This method has been used in the literature to evaluate the impact of the
economic policies. Ergstrom, Nordblom, Ohlsson and Persson (2014), for
example, have used the RKD to test if taxpayers are loss averse when filling
returns. They used regression kink and discontinuities to study the behaviour
of 3.6 millions Swedish taxpayers for the income year 2006 and discovered that
taxpayers experiencing a tax deficit are more likely to claim more deduction
than the taxpayers experiencing a tax surplus. This finding is coherent with
the loss aversion behaviour17.
In line with the parent theory named the RDD, when a policy is implemented
with error or the probability of being treated is not one, then a fuzzy RK
design can be used instead of a sharp design (Card, Lee, Zhuan Pei, Weber
2015)18.
16The parametric approach has difficulties into ensuring that the functional form of the
relationship between the conditional mean of the outcome variable and the rating variable
is correctly specified and so, the potential bias may increase.
17They estimate the following model (Engstrom, Nordblom, Ohlsson and Persson, 2014):
∆i =
∑k
k=0 αkpi,k +
∑k
k=0 βkIipi,k + i
where ∆i is the outcome variable, Ii is an indicator of punished municipality, pi is the
measure of punishment (It means the punishment if positive, or the grant if negative), and
i is an error term. The coefficient α0 measures the intercept, β0 measures the discontinuity
at the cut-off point and β1 measures a possible kink at the cut-ff point. The polynomial
k range from 0 (simply discontinuity at cut-off point ) to a number to 3 (Engstrom,
Nordblom, Ohlsson and Persson, 2014).
18They consider nonparametric identification and estimation in a nonseparable model
where a continuous regressor of interest is a known but kinked function of an observed
assignment variable (Card, Lee, Zhuan Pei, Weber, 2015).
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In addition, in line with the parent RDD, the difference between parametric
and nonparametric analysis in both theories is held.
The estimation can be implemented using the polynomial regression. The
equation must contain:
• an outcome variable
• the rating variable
• the kink
• the dummy variable for being to the right or to the left at the kink
point.
It must be:
Yi = α0 + α1Xi + β1XiDi + α2X
2
i + α3(XiDi)
2....
The coefficient β1 describes the change of the slope of the outcome variable
at the kink point. Next, we must run the same regression to get the change in
the slope of the treatment variable at the kink point of the running variable
and take the ratio between the two coefficients. The causal impact, that is
the Kink coefficient, is found by dividing the change in slope for the outcome
by the change in slope for the treatment.
2.3.3 The key assumptions for Regression Discontinu-
ity design and Regression Kink Design
The assumptions of the RK design and those of the RD design can be con-
sidered very similar, namely:
• The existence of no jump/non-change in the slope at the reference point
of the running variable for the covariates;
• The existence of non-manipulation of the assignment variable at the
kink point (McCrary, 2008). This hypothesis can be tested using the
McCrary test. If the agent can manipulate the threshold, but this
manipulation is not deterministic for the presence of errors, then this
kind of sorting can be allowed in the RK design (Card et al. 2015).
• For both designs Card, Lee, Zhuan Pei, Weber (2015) also suggest
placebo test at non-kink point.
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2.4 Empirical Model and Methodology
2.4.1 Set up and identification
This section describes the empirical strategy used to identify how being pun-
ished or rewarded affects the predetermined outcomes. In the previous sec-
tion we have discussed the mechanism of the property tax abolition, the
methodology of the grant allocation and the data. Now we seek to set up
the empirical model in order to analyse the data.
We primarily estimate three models according to the outcome variable se-
lected. The general model is represented by the following equation :
Yi = α0+α1Dummyi+α2Punishmenti+α3(Dummyi∗Punishmenti)+i
In these models Yi represents the outcome variable chosen for the analy-
sis.
The dummy variable tells us if the municipalities suffered a loss of resources,
that is whether a municipality can be considered a “loser” or a “winner”
after the property tax reform; the variable punishment defines the amount
of resources gained or lost after the property tax reform; and the interaction
term (Dummyi ∗ Punishmenti) defines the municipalities that experienced
a loss as well as the amount of that loss.
We replicate the estimation of the empirical model for each dependent vari-
able of interest, namely, the waste tax, the building permits and the current
expenditure.
2.4.2 The Methodology
The Variables: We start by explaining the main variable of interest: the
rating variable. This variable comprises the difference between the three
elements below:
• The per-capita revenues from the property tax (I.C.I.) on main dwellings
collected (“riscosso”) in 2007;
• the per-capita grants transferred from the government to the munic-
ipalities in order to compensate the abolished property tax on main
dwellings, as certified by the interior minister19; and
19The data on collected property tax on the main dwelling in 2007 represented the
benchmark for the definition of the amount of grant that each municipality must receive.
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• the per-capita revenues from the property tax on main dwellings col-
lected (“riscosso”) in 200820.
The tax rate and the estimation of the amount collected are formulated in
the estimated budget (“bilancio previsionale”) and successively re-written in
the final budget2122.
Using those data, we construct a variable capable of measuring the approx-
imate degree of loss or gain for each municipality. This variable, which we
call Punishment, will be the rating variable in our analysis. A positive value
of this variable means that the amount no longer collected was more than
the compensation grant received by the government. This means that these
municipalities would have gained more if the abolition had not been imple-
mented. So, it measures a sort of punishment. By contrast, a negative value
means that the compensation was more than the amount no longer collected
and the municipality would have had less if the property tax abolition had
not been implemented. So, it measures a sort of reward.
For simplicity, in the following pages, we refer to the municipalities that ex-
perienced a loss of resources following the property tax reform as “losers”
and to the municipalities that experienced a gain of resources following the
property tax reform as “winners”. Furthermore, in the following lines we
refer to the rating variable calling it simply “Punishment”. It is interesting
to note that being punished or rewarded cannot depend on the municipalities
willing, but it can be considered exogenous to the municipalities.
We construct the outcome variables using the following data:
1. Established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues from the waste tax in
2008 and 2009,
2. Established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues from building permits
between 2008 and 2009,
3. and committed (“impegnato”) per-capita current expenses between
2008 and 2009.
Indeed, municipalities must send data on this voice in the budget to the Court of Auditors
(“Corte dei Conti”) that has the role of control on these data. Next the control, government
must decide the amount of resource to transfer to each municipality.
20The collected property tax on the main dwelling in 2008, as said above, concerned the
luxury houses.
21The municipalities that programmed an increase in taxation in the estimated budget
for 2008 were not subject to the law n. 133/2008. This statement was established by the
Court of Auditors in order to avoid budget unbalances (Deliberation n. 92/2008).
22The established (“accertate”) resources in the final budget should be more or less close
to the amount programmed into the expected budget.
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We mainly define the outcome variable as first difference because it strongly
captures the change in taxation that follows the reform in property tax on
main dwellings in 2008.
Data cleaning For completeness of our analysis, we must deal with the
presence of incorrect data. Thus, we must deal with several zeros in the
amount of revenues in our dataset. As mentioned before, the number zero at
the voice of the tax in the budget municipality does not exactly mean that
there is no taxation, but it may mean that there was a lack of communication
of the correct data. Because of this, we propose treating the zeros in our
dataset as missing values. Obviously, this kind of problem may undermine
our analysis if the quantity of zeros is large enough. The number of zeros
changes according to the variables but, all in all, it remains below 15% of the
total sample.
In addition, we must deal with under-reported data, which could also cause
distortion. Thus, the excessive zeros and/or the presence of under-reported
data must be solved in order to guarantee the efficiency of the analysis.
Our data-cleaning strategy consists of not considering into the analysis all
observations possessing zero for the dependent variable23 and so treating
them as missing values24. Because of the presence of suspicious zeros in the
municipal budget, we may think that some observations could contain the
wrong information. The consequence is that the results of our estimation
using all the observations in the sample may not explain the reality.
In addition, the sample may contain some data with anomalies, that is,
values that appear too low or too high for some municipalities. It can thus
be very difficult to understand which data contain the wrong information
and which do not. In order to exclude the first type of observations, we
delete the outliers for all the variables that are more likely to contain wrong
information. This strategy, in our opinion, eliminates the false information,
leaving a considerable amount of true data in the sample.
We adopt the same procedures to deal with the same problem according to
the outcome variable used in the estimation:
• For the first difference between the established (“accertato”) waste tax
in 2009 and 2008, we exclude from the analysis the observations regard-
23We do not delete zero in the revenues of the property tax on main dwelling because
the fiscal reform in 2006 and 2008 caused a huge reduction for the revenues in that tax.
24The presence of zeros is also in the data used to construct the rating variable. We use
the nonparametric analysis and thus the choice of the optimal bandwidth excludes outlier
observations.
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ing the per-capita waste tax below the 5 percentile and up to the 99
percentile. In so doing, we delete those values suspected to be wrong
due to being too low or too high;
• For the committed (“impegnato”) current expenditure and established
(“accertato”) revenues for the building permits, we simply provide the
elimination from the analysis of the observations for the per-capita
current expenditures below the 5 and up to the 95 percentile, in order
to delete from the analysis values that are considered too low or too
high. This report seems to be more accurate than the reports of the
revenues from the waste tax. In particular, the missing values for the
expenditures are much less than the ones for the building permits or
the waste tax and in our opinion, they cannot manipulate the analysis.
We also eliminate observations below the 5 percentile and up to the 95 for
the main dwelling property taxes colelcted in 2007; we eliminate observa-
tions up to the 95 percentile for the main dwelling property tax collected in
2008; and we eliminate observations below the 1 percentile and up to the 99
percentile for the per-capita grant for compensation of the abolition of the
main dwellings property tax. Simultaneously, we apply a further deletion:
we eliminate the observations below the 1 and up to the 99 percentile for the
difference in the outcome variable selected.
With the issue of excessive zeros and wrong values in the dataset discussed,
we proceed with the estimation of our empirical model. We adopt the lo-
cal strategy, by preferring the nonparametric analysis to the parametric one.
However, problems may arise concerning whether the municipalities in the
treatment differ from the municipalities out of the treatment. The local
strategy reduces the former problem.
We conduct the analysis not on all the municipalities in the non-autonomous
regions25 but on residual municipalities, that is the ones that remain after
implementing our data-cleaning strategy.
Furthermore, we conduct the analysis by applying different empirical strate-
gies in order to make our results more robust.
2.4.3 Nonparametric Analysis
This approach uses the observations close to the cut-off point and contained
in an appropriate bandwidth, where the functional form is more likely to be
linear. The choice of appropriate bandwidth for the local strategy is challeng-
ing for the analysis. Choosing the bandwidth accurately makes it possible to
25The municipalities in non-autonomous regions are around 6700.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics.
TARSU(2008) TARSU(2009) ICI(2007) ICI(2008) Grant Punishment Delta Tax
Population
mean 88.47558 93.48102 58.03744 32.0346 39.36032 -13.23859 5.035189
sd 66.95789 69.88015 81.97757 86.94417 23.37985 107.5013 21.11357
N observations 6,690 6,687 6,687 6,690 6,684 6,670 6,682
Sample
mean 97.66303 103.5166 44.94257 18.54305 36.45546 -10.05593 5.853569
sd 39.53888 41.28746 31.11183 40.32194 19.50684 45.20608 12.76352
N observations 4,624 4,624 4,624 4,624 4,624 4,624 4,624
The table shows descriptive statistics for the per-capita waste tax established in 2008 and 2009, the per-
capita property tax on main dwelling collected in 2007 and 2008, the per-capita compensatory grant
in 2008, the per-capita Punishment (rating variable) in 2008 and the first difference in the per-capita
waste tax between 2009 and 2008.
Figure 2.1: Kink estimates of the first difference in per-capita waste tax for
all municipalities in ordinary regions.
solve the trade-off between precision and bias. In fact, a larger bandwidth
may guarantee greater precision in the model’s estimation. On the other
hand, the linear specification may be less accurate, and it may lead to bias
when the treatment effect is estimated.
Since our sample size could be considered large enough, particularly around
the cut-off point, we use the nonparametric estimation as the principal method
of analysis. Then, we use the parametric estimation as a robustness check.
In addition, the restriction of the sample to those observations close to the
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cut-off point may ensure the exclusion of “doubtful”26 observations for the
rating variable. Indeed, in this case the choice of the nonparametric pro-
cedure also appears to be strategically important. The local strategy views
the estimation of the treatment effect as a local randomisation and it limits
the analysis solely to the observations that are close to the cut-off, excluding
those that are too far from that point. Adopting this strategy means exclud-
ing those observations that may contain wrong information and that are far
from the reference point. The reasons for this are the same as those that
we have discussed for eliminating values that are too low or too high: since
the observations suspected to contain wrong information are those with very
low or very high values, the choice of bandwidth automatically deletes those
observations that are far from the cut-off point and thus are more likely to
be incorrect.
The main decision in applying the nonparametric analysis concerns the choice
of methodology for selecting the optimal bandwidth. The literature on regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD) has proposed two procedures for choosing
the bandwidth: the “cross-validation” procedure and the “plugs-in” proce-
dure. Both procedures concern the concept of mean square error (MSE),
which exactly measures the trade-off, discussed above, between bias and pre-
cision. In addition, both procedures are also computationally complicated.
As stated before, the “plug-in” procedure defines the optimal bandwidth ac-
cording to the sample data and it balances the degree of precision and bias.
The concept is to find a formula that defines a bandwidth that minimises a
particular function of precision and bias. Fan and Gijbels (1996) developed a
method in the context of local linear regression that DesJardins and McCall
(2008) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009, 2012) modified for the RD set-
ting.
Recently Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) elaborated a method for
the optimal bandwidth selection for sharp RD, sharp kink RD, fuzzy RD
and fuzzy kink RD. Thus we utilise the CCT method as the main reference.
We also employ Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) procedure which, like
the previous one, can be considered particularly intensive, in addition to the
cross-validation procedure by Rice and Silverman (1991)27.
Fortunately, there are several programmes available on the Internet implant-
ing the procedure for an optimal bandwidth selection.
26We refer to “doubtful” observations as the ones too low or too high.
27However, we do not show the results for this method because they are in line with IK
and CCT’s results.
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2.4.4 Testing the assumptions
The underlying assumption generating the local random assignment result
is that each individual has imprecise control over the assignment variable.
McCrary (2008) proposed a simple two- step procedure for testing whether
or not a discontinuity exists in the density of the assignment variable. In the
first step, the assignment variable is partitioned into equally spaced bins and
frequencies are computed within those bins (McCrary, 2008). The second
step treats the frequency counts as a dependent variable in a local linear
regression (McCrary, 2008).
By definition of our rating variable, we exclude the possibility of manipulation
around the threshold by municipal governments. We define the rating vari-
able as the difference between the revenues from the main dwelling property
tax collected by each municipality in 2007, the grant to the municipalities
certified by the central government in 2008 and the revenues from the main
dwelling property tax collected by each municipality in 2008. As a result, it
is quite impossible for the municipalities close to the threshold to manipulate
the rating variable in order to move to the left or the right of the reference
point.
The revenues collected from the main dwelling property tax are consolidated
in 2007 and no longer modifiable in 2008 and beyond. In addition, the mu-
nicipalities have no power to influence the amount of grants in 2008, as the
central governments decided the amount of resources for compensation in the
annual budget law based on historical data. Thus, the compensation can-
not be exactly calculated ex-ante due to the uncertainty regarding the total
amount funded by the government as well as uncertainty regarding the data
about the main dwelling property tax transmitted from the municipalities to
the interior minister.
The only way that the municipalities had to manipulate the threshold was to
modify the main dwelling property tax collected (“riscosso”) in 2008. How-
ever, the municipal government cannot change the tax rate during the year.
The tax rate is defined in the expected budget and there is no room for
changes after the approval of that document. The expected budget also con-
tains the expected amount of revenues from the main dwelling property tax
and all other voices in the budget. Obviously, this amount of money can
change during the year and thus could differ than the amount included in
the final budget. However, we cannot expect a tremendous change, especially
for 2008, because the main dwelling property tax involved only the luxury
dwellings.
For the reasons stated above, we can assume that the assumption of ma-
nipulation at the threshold is not violated even if we do not implement the
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McCrary test.
We are dealing with cross-sectional data and, in conclusion, we are in the
“sharp” design28, where the rating variable perfectly predicts the treatment
status.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Cross-section analysis: Results for difference in
per-capita waste tax
We use the optimal bandwidth selection methods most cited in literature:
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (CCT) and Imbens and Kalayanaraman
(IK). Then, we implement the OLS estimation on the local linear model for
the selected bandwidths.
CCT criterion Here and below, we illustrate the results according to the
outcome variable for the bandwidth selected using the CCT (Calonico, Catta-
neo and Titiunik, 2014) criterion applied with the difference in the per-capita
waste tax between 2009 and 2008 as the outcome variable.
The CCT bandwidth criterion selection provides the optimal bandwidth for
our sample around 14 euros. Thus, we approximate it to 14 and we estimate
the model with observations that lie in the bandwidth selected.
Kink and discontinuity estimates of the linear model are reported for a range
of symmetric bandwidth.
Let’s focus on the estimated coefficient α3(Interaction) . This coeffi-
cient measures the change in the derivative at the cut-off point. It retrieves
the change in slope in outcome at the kink point in the treatment variable.
Hence, it represents a proxy of the kink point. The casual impact per unit
is found by dividing α3 by the difference in derivatives at the cut-off point
which is calculated mathematically and not econometrically.
Thus, the kink in outcome needs to be scaled by the kink in treatment.
Obviously, we are also interested in whether or not a discontinuity at the
reference point exists.
Table 2.3 illustrates the estimation results. Discontinuity is measured by the
coefficient α1(Discontinuity). The coefficients, for the selected bandwidth,
have different signs: the kink coefficient is positive while the discontinuity
28With the sharp design all subjects receive their assigned treatment or control condition
while the with the fuzzy design some subjects do not.
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Table 2.3: Nonparametric analysis, CCT Method
Method CCT
Outcome Delta Tax
Punishment -0.00537
(0.074)
Discontinuity -0.958
(0.772)
Interaction 0.265**
(0.123)
Constant 5.292***
(0.511)
Observations 2,755
R-squared 0.003
The table shows the results for the difference between the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues
from the waste tax in 2009 and 2008 (Delta Tax), using OLS estimation. The second column reports
the estimation for the bandwidth ±14. RK sample contains Italian municipalities belonging to the
non-autonomous regions that lie in the bandwidth selected. We are interested in the result for the
the kink coefficient. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust
standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
coefficient is negative. In addition, the coefficient that indicates the discon-
tinuity is not significant. By contrast, the coefficient that indicates the likely
kink is statistically significant and positive (Interaction > 0). A positive
kink means that municipalities to the right of the reference point (munici-
palities that experienced a loss after the property tax reform) increased more
waste taxation than those to the left.
Looking at Figure 2.2 the kink appears evident. Indeed, the plot provides
a different behaviour for municipalities on the left and on the right of the
cut-off point. It clearly shows the different fiscal behaviour between better
off and worse off municipalities.
Figure 2.2 shows an increase in the waste tax on both sides of the reference
point. The general increase in waste tax could be explained by the need
to face fiscal difficulties and/or by politicians opportunistic behavior. The
finding support empirical literature on fiscal decentralization mechanism.
First, the reduction of fiscal autonomy reduces political accountability. In
our case, local governments could gain rents from the increase in waste taxes
because they were no longer politically responsible for the property tax on
the main dwelling, and thus an increase in local taxation was less politically
expensive. Indeed in the case of fiscal autonomy voters may better recog-
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Figure 2.2: RDplot for the difference in waste tax, CCT optimal bandwidth
selection method.
The figure shows the difference between the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues from the
waste tax in 2009 and 2008 (Delta Tax) on the vertical axis and the punishment on horizontal axis.
Negative value for the punishment means that municipalities gain from the reform.
nize the good politicians if they are allowed to set the tax rate (Bordignon,
Turati and Gramalerio, 2013). Then, less fiscal autonomous municipalities
may exhibit a less efficient fiscal behaviour than the more fiscal autonomous
municipalities.
In addition, the substitution of the property tax on the main dwelling by a
governmental grant may induce voters to underestimate the local fiscal bur-
den. In our case, fiscal illusion generated by the switch between tax and grant
may lead to an underestimation of the waste tax burden by voters. There-
fore, the increase in local taxes becomes less expensive in terms of votes and
local politicians may gain rents through expenditure channel.
In general, this framework may induce local politicians to increase local tax-
ation regardless they have gained or lost resources after the property tax
reform. However, the results of the estimation and the graph seem to sug-
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gest that politicians in different scenarios behave in different ways.
The curve (Figure 2.2) that fits the points on the left of the cut-off point is
almost horizontal; it means that politicians of better off municipalities did
not set the tax on waste according to the degree of gain obtained after the
property tax reform. The increase in waste tax was, on average, almost the
same for all the “winners” municipalities, regardless the amount of extra-
resources that they received following the property tax reform.
By contrast, the curve that fits the points on the right of the cut-off point
has a positive slope. Politicians of worse off municipalities increased the level
of waste taxation more than politicians in the opposite scenario; in addition,
the more they lost the more they increased the waste tax.
In particular, local governments rewarded with extra-resources did not man-
age the extra amount to fund a decrease in waste taxes; possibly they used
the extra resources from the grant (and the waste tax) to gain political rents.
Rationally, we may expect a decrease in waste tax for those municipalities
on the left of the cut-off point; this decrease may also be expected to be
of similar magnitude as the increase for the municipalities in the opposite
scenario.
However, Figure 2.2 shows an opposite fiscal behaviour by local politicians
in the “good” state.
On the other hand, politicians of worse off municipalities reacted increasing
the waste tax in the direction of the punishment: the farther they moved to
the right of the reference point, the more they increased the waste tax.
Hence, in a scenario where Italian municipalities increased (on average) the
waste tax, “loser” municipalities increased it more for the fear of the loss in
revenues.
The finding suggests that local politicians may fear the loss of resources.
Differently, “winner” municipalities increased the waste tax but regardless of
the degree of gain.
The finding suggests that more fiscal centralization may not lead to more fis-
cal discipline. In particular, local politicians may have used the extra grant
and other fiscal instruments, such as the increase in waste tax, to deal with
budget difficulties and/or to gain political rents.
Results for IK bandwidth selection criterion: Here and below, we
describe the results according to the outcome variable for the bandwidth
selected using the IK (Imbens and Kalayanaraman, 2012) criterion.
The IK bandwidth criterion selection provides the optimal bandwidth for
our sample around 18 euros. We estimate the model with observations that
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lie in the bandwidth selected and we approximate it to 18.
The results are the same as those obtained using the CCT criterion (Table
2.4).
Table 2.4: Nonparametric analysis, IK Method
Method IK
Outcome Delta Tax
Punishment -0.00381
(0.0552)
Discontinuity -0.896
(0.712)
Interaction 0.237**
(0.0949)
Constant 5.299***
(0.461)
Observations 3,040
R-squared 0.004
The table shows the results for the difference between the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues
from the waste tax in 2009 and 2008 (Delta Tax), using OLS estimation. The second column reports
the estimation for the bandwidth ±18. RK sample contains Italian municipalities belonging to the
non-autonomous regions that lie in the bandwidth selected. We are interested in the result for the
the kink coefficient. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust
standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Kink-estimation: Figure 2.4 reports our estimates of a possible kink at
zero reference point for our outcome variable. The estimated kink demon-
strates significant and positive results for all the bandwidths except around
15 euros and from 8 to 6 euros. The kink coefficients remain stable and pos-
itive in a wide range of bandwidth from 30 to 9 euros. The estimates start
to fluctuate considerably for very narrow bandwidths.
2.5.2 Sensitivity analysis-placebo kink and discontinu-
ities
It is interesting to ask whether or not kinks or discontinuities at the 0 refer-
ence point are more pronounced than kinks or discontinuities at other refer-
ence points. We provide estimates of the kinks and the discontinuities based
on a range of different placebo reference points. We let the placebo reference
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Figure 2.3: RDplot for the difference in waste tax, IK optimal bandwidth
selection method.
The figure shows the difference between the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues from the
waste tax in 2009 and 2008 (Delta Tax) on the vertical axis and the punishment variable on horizontal
axis. Negative value for the punishment means that municipalities gain from the property tax reform.
points to vary between +10 and −10 . The bandwidth is fixed at 14 euros29
in all the regressions and it is symmetric around the placebo reference points.
The analysis has an important goal. The evidence of casual effect is stronger
if we obtain that the discontinuity and kinks for the difference in waste tax
are more pronounced for the 0 cut-off point (that is the theoretically pre-
dicted reference point) than elsewhere (Engstrom, Nordblom, Ohlsson and
Persson, 2014).
Table 2.5 shows the results for the discontinuity and kink coefficients esti-
mation.
The kink-estimates remains positive and significant at reference points of
3,4, -1 and -2, which are very close to the 0 cut-off. However, these kink point
are less pronounced than the 0 kink point. Instead, the remaining reference
29We use the CCT procedures for the optimal bandwidth selection.
58
2.5 Empirical results
Table 2.5: Discontinuity/Kink-placebo estimates of α1 and α3 for first differ-
ence in per-capita waste tax.
Reference Point Discontinuity Kink Reference Point Discontinuity Kink
1 0.243 0.153 -1 -0.624 0.226*
(0.853) (0.124) (0.743) (0.118)
2 -0.451 0.206 -2 -0.202 0.201*
(1.001) (0.135) (0.744) (0.116)
3 -0.426 0.268** -3 0.1612 0.186
(1.069) (0.125) (0.78) (0.115)
4 -0.266 0.254* -4 0.755 0.203
(1.276) (0.148) (0.84) (0.115)
5 0.406 0.21 -5 -0.328 0.146
(1.523) (0.156) (1.066) (0.121)
6 1.104 0.094 -6 -0.726 0.063
(1.823) (0.171) (1.235) (0.129)
7 1.246 0.0374 -7 -0.591 -0.023
(2.18) (0.189) (1.307) (0.132)
8 2.255 -0.12 -8 -1.308 -0.083
(2.487) (0.197) (1.58) (0.136)
9 3.65 -0.268 -9 0.403 -0.022
(2.887) (0.208) (1.703) (0.139)
10 0.588 -0.098 -10 -0.756 -0.08
(2.86) (0.203) (2.078) (0.157)
The table shows the estimates of α1 and α3 for first difference in per-capita waste tax and different
reference point, using OLS estimation. The bandwidth selected is ±14. RK sample contains Italian
municipalities belonging to the non-autonomous regions that lie in the bandwidth selected. Significance
at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered
at municipal level.
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Figure 2.4: Kink estimates for the first difference in per-capita waste tax.
points show no evidence of the presence of kinks and/or discontinuities.
2.5.3 Cross-section analysis: Results for other outcome
variables
Municipalities have different fiscal tools for facing the loss of resources after
the property tax reform. In particular, municipalities may decrease the cur-
rent expenditure and/or increase other voices of the revenues. We replicate
the analysis with other outcome variables of interest.
Results for difference in current expenditure: We are also interested
in the behaviour of municipalities in terms of current expenditure cuts. In-
deed, municipalities may adjust their expenses instead of increasing taxes in
order to face a fall in revenues side. This tool may be less distortive than
manipulating taxation in terms of votes: people may fear more the rise in
taxation than the cut in expenditure. In addition, a cut in the inefficient
current expenditure may have a positive effect on economy30 (Alesina and
Ardagna, 2010 and 2013).
What emerges from the estimation indicates that there are no significant dif-
30Cut in the inefficiency current expenditure in the national budget had expansive effect
(Alesina and Ardagna, 2010 and 2013).
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ferences in the variation of the current expenses between the municipalities
on the left and on the right of the cut-off point. No significant jumps and no
significant kink (Table 2.6) largely suggest that Italian municipalities faced
the resources uncertainty by manipulating the revenues. So, a cut to the
current expenditures has not been a tool in the municipal fiscal policy, even
if the municipality suffered a loss of resources.
The finding suggests the difficulties of local bureaucrats and politicians to
reduce the current expenditure in the short-run. In addition, the substitution
of a local tax by a governmental grant may have induced local politicians to
increase the taxation since this fiscal instrument was less expensive in terms
of votes than the cut in the local expenditures.
Furthermore, the fitted curves in Figure 2.5 are quite horizontal from both
sides of the reference point. Politicians have the same behaviour for the cur-
rent expenditures regardless they receive a gain or a loss from the abolition
of the main dwelling property tax.
Table 2.6: Nonparametric analysis, CCT Method
Outcome Delta Expenditure
Punishment -0.0328
(0.256)
Discontinuity -3.928
(3.29)
Interaction 0.0001
(0.394)
Constant 11.29***
(2.335)
Observations 3,324
R-squared 0.002
The table shows the results for the difference between committed (“impegnato”) per-capita current
expenditure between 2009 and 2008 (Delta Expenditure), using OLS estimation. The second column
reports the estimation for the bandwidth ±18. RK sample contains Italian municipalities belonging to
the non-autonomous regions that lie in the bandwidth selected. We are interested in the result for the
the kink coefficient. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust
standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Results for building permits We extend the analysis above to the build-
ing permits. Municipalities may react to the loss or gain of revenues as a
consequence of the abolition of the main dwelling property tax by limiting
or increasing the issue of building permits. In particular, municipalities that
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Figure 2.5: RDplot for the difference in current expenditure, CCT optimal
bandwidth selection method.
The figure shows the difference between the committed (“impegnato”) per-capita current expenditure
between 2009 and 2008 (Delta Expenditure) on the vertical axis and the punishment variable on
horizontal axis. Negative value for the punishment means that municipalities gain from the property
tax reform.
experienced a loss of resources are more likely to be boosted by increas-
ing the issue of building permits in order to increase the revenues to face
the loss. In addition, new dwellings increase the revenues from property
taxes on dwellings. However, on the other hand the abolition of the main
dwelling property taxes may negatively effect the issuing of building permits:
the building of new main dwellings does not increase revenues and thus the
“benefits” from issuing building permits may be less than the environmental
costs related to the permits.
Mainly, the property tax reform may lead to two different effects on building
permits:
1. Increasing them to compensate the loss of revenues;
2. Reducing them due to the lack of revenues from property tax on new
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main dwellings.
In this scenario, municipalities that experienced a gain or a loss of resources
after the reform on property tax may behave differently.
What emerges from the estimation is that there are no significant differences
in the variation of the established (“accertato”) revenues from building per-
mits between the municipalities on the left and on the right of the cut-off
point. No jump and no kink largely suggest that Italian municipalities faced
the resource uncertainty by manipulating other voices in the revenues.
2.6 Robustness check
2.6.1 Parametric analysis
We implement the parametric strategy for our sample as robustness check.
The parametric strategy allows to use all the observations in the sample and
not only those located close to the cut-off point, i.e. where the regression
function is more likely to be linear31 (Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012).
The following equation provides a simple way to make this estimation pro-
cedure optimal:
• Yi = α0 + α1Dummyi+
+α2Punishmenti + α3Interactioni + f(Punishmenti;Dummyi) + i
In these models Yi represents the difference in per-capita waste tax.
The dummy variable tells us if the municipalities suffered a loss of resources,
that is whether a municipality can be considered a “loser” or a “winner”
after the property tax reform; the variable Punishment defines the amount
of resources gained or lost after the property tax reform; and the interaction
term (Dummyi ∗ Punishmenti) defines the municipalities that experienced
a loss as well as the amount of that loss.
The function f(Punishmenti;Dummyi) is our control function. A variety of
functional form can be tested to determine which fits the data best, so that
biased will be minimized. In our model, we use polynomial function with
31This method gains strength from observations far from the threshold point to estimate
the average outcome for observations close to the threshold point. In order to minimize
the bias, it can be used several functional forms for the rating variable (linear, quadratic,
cubic, interaction terms, etc). The choice of the appropriate functional form is conducted
by F-test on higher-order interaction terms and inspecting the residuals (Jacob, Zhu,
Somers and Bloom 2012).
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interaction term from 1st to 4th order.
Table 2.7 contains the estimation results for each equation. The Kink coef-
ficient (Interaction) remains positive for all polynomial specifications and it
maintains the significance in almost all the specifications. The results con-
firm the different behaviour for the “losers” municipalities: the municipalities
that experienced a loss increased the level of taxation and the more they lost
the more they increased the waste tax. Thus, the results of the estimation
seems to suggest that municipalities did not behave similarly: punished mu-
nicipalities increased the waste tax more for the fear of the loss in revenues.
Table 2.7: Parametric Analysis
Polynomial order p(1)-interaction p(2)-interaction p(3)-interaction p(4)-interaction
Outcome Delta Tax Delta Tax Delta Tax Delta Tax
Punishment -0.0132* -0.0391 -0.0872* -0.00963
(0.00677) (0.0238) (0.0482) (0.0779)
Discontinuity 0.341 -0.368 -0.226 -0.686
(0.47) (0.574) (0.69) (0.795)
Interaction 0.0303* 0.199*** 0.287*** 0.256
(0.0169) (0.0545) (0.109) (0.178)
Punishment2 0.000203 0.00118 -0.00178
(0.00018) (0.000882) (0.00256)
Interaction2 -0.00215*** -0.004550 -0.0045700
(0.000654) (0.00329) (0.00955)
Punishment3 -0.000005 0.0000293
(0.000004) (0.0000278)
Interaction3 0.000016 0.0000408
(0.000026) (0.0001760)
Punishment4 -0.0000001
(0.0000001)
Interaction4 -0.0000002
(0.000001)
Constant 5.415*** 5.155*** 4.855*** 5.192***
(0.273) (0.332) (0.41) (0.486)
Observations 4,511 4,511 4,511 4,511
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005
The table shows the results for the difference between the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues
from the waste tax in 2009 and 2008 (Delta Tax), using OLS estimation. Each column reports the
estimation for different forms in the control function: (1) the first-order polynomial case, (2) the
second-order polynomial case, (3) the third-order polynomial case and (4) the fourth-order polynomial
case. RK sample contains Italian municipalities belonging to the non-autonomous regions that lie in
the bandwidth selected. We are interested in the result for the the kink coefficient. Significance at 1%
is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at
municipal level.
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2.6.2 Panel analysis
In the second part of our robustness check, we replicate the analysis devel-
oped above, using an extended sample. We use the time series from 2008 to
2009.
The empirical model to estimate becomes:
WasteTaxi,t+1 = α0 +α1Dummyi,t+α2Punishmenti,t+α3Interactioni,t
+µi + ζt + i,t
The outcome variable, in this case, consists in the established (“accer-
tato”) per-capita revenues from the waste tax in 2009 and in 2010. Munic-
ipalities may set this kind of tax according to they were in the “winner” or
“loser” status in the previous year. The dummy variable tells us if the mu-
nicipalities suffered a loss of resources, that is whether a municipality can be
considered a “loser” or a “winner” after the property tax reform; the variable
Punishment defines the amount of resources gained or lost after the property
tax reform; the Interactioni,t term (Dummyi,t ∗ Punishmenti,t) defines the
municipalities that experienced a loss and the amount of that loss.
ζt is the time dummy and µi the municipality fixed effect. In particular,
the fixed effect assumes an important role in our analysis. It captures char-
acteristics for each municipality that remain fixed during time. The waste
tax is calculated on the basis of the cost of waste disposal that mainly de-
pends from fixed or quasi-fixed characteristics of each municipality (density
of population, altitude, etc.). Thus, the fixed effect captures differences in
municipalities that are allowed in cross-section analysis.
Nonparametric strategy We use the optimal bandwidth selection meth-
ods most cited in the literature: Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (CCT)
method. Then, we implement the OLS estimation on local linear model for
the bandwidths selected. Even in this case both procedures (CCT and IK
procedures) approximate the optimal bandwidth around 14 euros.
Table 2.8 shows the estimation results. The interaction coefficient α3 remains
positive and significant. Thus, the panel analysis confirms the cross-section
estimated results.
Kink-estimation The Figure 2.6 shows the results for the kink coefficient
α3 for different bandwidth selected for the response of the municipalities to
the loss or gain of revenues as consequence of the abolition of the property
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Table 2.8: Panel analysis: nonparametric approach
Outcome Waste Tax
Punishment -0.461***
(0.175)
Discontinuity 0.0339
(1.516)
Interaction 0.922**
(0.37)
2009.year 8.918***
(0.363)
Constant 102.3***
(1.026)
Observations 5,719
Municipalities 3,374
R-squared 0.217
The table shows the results for the established (“accertato”) per-capita revenues from the waste tax
in 2009 and 2010, using OLS estimation. RK sample contains Italian municipalities belonging to the
non-autonomous regions that lie in the bandwidth selected of 14 euros. We are interested in the result
for the the kink coefficient. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *.
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
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tax on the main dwelling in 2008 and in 200932.
The chart reports our estimates of a possible kink at zero reference point
for our outcome variable. The estimated kink results significant and positive
for all bandwidth except between 26 and 25 euros, between 20 and 18 euros,
and around 12 euros and 7 euros. However, the kink coefficients remain
stable and positive (approximately) for bandwidth from 30 to 6 euros. The
estimates start to fluctuate hugely for very narrow bandwidths.
Figure 2.6: Kink estimates for per-capita waste tax.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the reaction of Italian municipalities to the
property tax reform of 2008. In particular, we studied how the uncertain
refund affects the budget and the choice of local fiscal policies. Uncertainty
was also exacerbated by the vagueness of the method that the interior minis-
ter decided to implement to guarantee an efficient allocation of the resources.
Thus, this muddling through represents a considerable weakness of the prop-
erty tax reform. In addition, municipalities must apply broad and stringent
domestic fiscal rules and in that period they were subject to the historic
process of gradual reduction of the fiscal dependence on the central state. In
32The outcome variable used is the established (“accertato”) revenues from waste tax
in 2009 and 2010.
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this scenario local governments must achieve two main goals: to commit the
fiscal rule and to maintain the political consensus.
The exogenous shock generated by the abolition of the main dwelling prop-
erty tax may have had either a positive or a negative effect on municipal
budgets. For this reason, we split Italian municipalities in two types: 1)
better off municipalities (“winners”), that managed more resources after the
property tax reform and 2) worse off municipalities (“losers”), that managed
less resources after the property tax reform.
The municipalities affected by the negative shock may have reacted either
by increasing the revenues or by decreasing the expenses. On the revenues
side, the only fiscal tools that could have been used by the municipalities
was, primarily, the waste tax and/or the revenues from the building permits.
Our findings are consistent with our initial hypothesis: municipalities used
the waste tax to ensure themselves against the uncertainty from the main
dwelling property tax reform. In general, Italian municipalities increased the
revenues from the waste tax. However, municipalities that experienced a
certain amount of resource gain behaved differently than municipalities that
experienced an equivalent loss of resources.
Municipalities on the right of the cut-off point (worse off municipalities) set
the waste tax according to the degree of loss. The farther they moved to the
right of the reference point, the more they increased the waste tax. Hence,
losers municipalities raised the taxation according to the degree of loss.
The “winner” municipalities, instead, experienced a constant increase in tax-
ation regardless of the amount of gain that followed the property tax reform.
Hence, for those municipalities the extra-resource did not translate into a
waste tax decrease. It would have been reasonable to think that the extra-
resources would have been used to reduce other municipal taxes as well as to
improve the local services33. Thus, we can suppose they used the additional
resources from the extra-grant plus the additional revenues from the waste
tax to gain political rents.
In summary, local politicians did not seem to consider the gain from the
property tax reform when they set the waste tax. On the contrary, they
seemed to fear the loss from the property tax reform and they set the waste
tax according to the degree of loss.
Analysing the electoral results for the municipalities in the treatment could
constitute a further interesting research proposal. It could be interesting
to understand whether or not the incumbent politicians benefited from the
property tax reform in terms of votes. In brief, it may be interesting to test
whether the mayors of the “winner” municipalities had a higher probability
33At that time, the waste tax was one of the main tool for the local fiscal policy.
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of being re-elected than the mayors of the “losers” municipalities.
In addition, what emerged from the analysis is that the main dwelling prop-
erty tax was substituted, in part, by the waste tax. This substitution was
stronger for municipalities clustered as “losers”. As a consequence, the sub-
stitution reduced the equality principle for the local taxation: a tax calcu-
lated based on the dwelling’s economic value was partially substituted by a
tax that simply considered the size of the dwelling without concerning its
economic value.
On the expenditure side, neither the “winners” nor the “losers” municipalities
seemed to cut or increase their current expenses as reaction to the property
tax reform. Reducing expenditures to face the expected revenue reduction
was not the strategy chosen by local governments. The reason may involve
the difficulties of further cutting the municipal expenditure as well as the
related social cost that this process involves, especially if it has achieved its
lower bound. In particular, municipal expenses had been subject to signif-
icant cut since the nineteens and the process of transferring greater power
to local entities empowered the same to guarantee a series of services that
are very difficult to cut efficiently, so it may be extremely complicated for
several municipalities to find room for further expenditures decrease in the
short-term.
In addition, the main dwelling property tax reform also boost in this direc-
tion, that is to force the manipulation of the revenues side instead of the ex-
penditures one. Indeed, the mechanism of reallocation of resources following
the abolition of the main dwelling property tax incentives local politicians’
opportunistic behaviour. Substituting a local tax by a governmental grant
reduced the political cost of increase local taxation and could incentive local
government to increase the expenditures for political consensus.
In sum, instead of cutting the local expenditures local governments in the
bad state preferred to increase local taxation to deal with the abolition of the
main dwelling property tax. This could be occurred because in a scenario
of more fiscal centralization reducing the current expenditure may be more
expensive than rising local taxation.
We summarise the main findings as follows:
• Municipalities acted differently in terms of waste tax implementation.
Their behaviour depended on the benefits or costs they assumed to have
after the abolition of the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling. In
particular, municipalities that suffered a loss of resources more greatly
increased the waste tax;
• Municipalities in the bad state preferred to increase the taxation rather
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than to cut the current expenditure in order to face low fiscal imbal-
ances;
• The property tax reform led to an imperfect substitution between the
property tax on main dwelling and the waste tax, with a related loss
in equality for local taxation.
In short, the elimination of the property tax on the main dwelling may have
led to an increase of waste tax for both “winners” and “losers” municipalities
mainly because of an opportunistic behaviour by local politicians.
However, in this scenario emerges the different behaviour between the two
types of municipalities in term of how much is the increase. This different
behaviour could be explained by the fact that politicians of “losers” munici-
palities have feared the loss of revenues.
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Chapter 3
The hidden effect of the
reduction in fiscal autonomy
and the partisan effect
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal transfers from government to municipalities should be motivated by
efficiency and equity considerations. Governments transfer resources from
the richest regions to the poorest ones for redistribution purposes. How-
ever,when allocating resources to municipalities politicians may be moved by
opportunistic behaviour. Efficiency and equity may be underestimated com-
pared to vote maximisation considerations. Indeed, what may emerge is that
governments may allocate more resources to those municipalities politically
aligned with them. Thus, governments may use a sort of ideological closeness
criteria in determining resource allocation, generating what we define in our
analysis the “partisan effect”1.
The empirical research on political economy has tested the existence of this
opportunistic behaviour by politicians. In particular, literature has associ-
ated the implementation of this kind of policy to the cases in which the grant
is not based on a formula or where rules regulating the grant allocation are
ambiguous or not transparent. Based on literature, we test the existence
of the so-called “partisan effect” after the 2008 fiscal reform regarding the
abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
1In this chapter, we use this definition to define the effect of the allocation of resources
motivated by political reasons: an upper layer of government gives more resources to its
subordinates if they belong to the same political party/coalition. Partisan effect means
that politicians close to the party or coalition at the upper tier of government are rewarded.
In our case, mayors connected to the governmental politicians receive more resources.
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In 2008, the Italian political debate was monopolised by the argument about
the abolition of the main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.). The centre-right
premier candidate used this policy announcement as an instrument to win
the election. When Berlusconi’s government was in charge, it abolished the
main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.). As a consequence, the amount of rev-
enues no longer collected was substituted by grants. The government had
to decide the amount of resources to be refunded to Italian municipalities
and how the grant should be allocated. In particular, the rules regulating
the amount of refund and the criteria for an efficient redistribution of those
resources are defined in the annual budget law (“legge finanziaria2”).
In 2008, Berlusconi’s government delegated the interior minister to calcu-
late the grant to allocate to each municipality. It established that the new
grant must be aligned to the 2007’s data about the main dwelling property
tax produced by local governments. Furthermore, the role of controlling and
monitoring these data was delegated to the Court of Auditors (a non-political
institution) while the residual control was delegated to the interior minister.
While it seems difficult to find the discretionary role of governments, the
higher degree of uncertainty regarding data certificated by municipalities and
the crucial role played by the interior minister may allow the government to
reward those municipalities politically linked to it. In this way, maximising
votes could be considered a further driver in addition to efficiency and equity
principles.
Rather than to discuss the effect of capital tax abolition on economy, the aim
of this paper is to investigate whether or not the abolition of this tax has
a hidden goal. Indeed, the abolition of the main dwelling property tax led
to an increase in the amount of transfers from the centre to municipalities
along with a decrease in fiscal autonomy. In brief, municipalities became
more dependent on the government. Thus, this fiscal dependence from the
centre distorts the behaviour of local politicians towards lobbying with the
central government rather than efficiently providing public goods(Persson
and Tabellini, 1994).
In this scenario, the government may have allocated a higher number of
grants to municipalities, which were politically linked to it, that is belong-
ing to the same party coalition as the government. Thus, this strategy may
allow politicians of the majority to maintain and increase votes. Indeed, it
may also confirm mayor loyalty: the mayor is motivated to demonstrate his
loyalty and, in this way, he receives higher transfers that, in turn, could raise
2From 2009 it has been named “legge di stabilita`”.
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the probability of the mayor of being re-elected3. According to literature (see
Nannicini, Brollo, 2012) an increase in transfers may make re-election more
likely and may discourage entries from running in the electoral challenge. In
this way, central and local governments may assure a good position in the
elections within their mandate and reinforce themselves for the next govern-
mental election.
However, this could generate a vicious cycle where bad politicians, and not
good ones, gain support, just because they are connected with the govern-
ment4.
Using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach, we empirically test whether
the abolition of the main dwelling property tax and the subsequent increase
in transfers led to the so-called “partisan effect”5, that is, if the government
used the possibility of ruling on the distribution of resources to allocate more
resources to mayors belonging to its coalition.
The approach here is to assume the existence of “backward-looking” politi-
cians who reward their “core” voters .Bear in mind that, even if rewarding
the “core” voters turns out not to be a motive for distributing transfers, this
does not mean that the allocation is based solely on efficiency and equity. In
some cases, governments may transfer resources to the richer municipalities
in swing votes. So, as tested in literature (Johansson, 2003), the partisan
effect may be substituted by the swing vote effect: politicians may use their
role to gain swing votes.
As stated above, a shortcoming of this analysis is whether or not the govern-
ment can influence the amounts of transfers to local administrations: does
an operating space for the government exist? Is it big enough?
The law rules the grants; so in principle this may exclude the possibility for
the government to affect local grants. However, the government makes the
rules. For example, it may decide to transfer more resources to a specific
geographic area, due to the presence of a local party in its coalition. Thus,
in this case, it may affect the law in order to transfer more resources to the
North, to the Centre or to the South. Equally, the government may dis-
tribute resources to compensate the property tax abolition with the aim of
guaranteeing room for “pork-barrel” policies.
3Having higher transfers means having higher revenues and to manage more resources
for local economic policies.
4Obviously this strategy is very difficult (if not impossible) to implement. Government
cannot modify the law on transfer introducing a sort of explicit partisan criteria, for
example on the principle that municipalities belonging to the same political coalition have
more money!
5See the definition in the notes above.
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In short, this chapter strives to test whether or not the government has
allocated resources to compensate the abolition of the main dwelling property
tax according to political purposes.
3.2 Institutional Framework
3.2.1 Tiers of government and local public finance
Italy is a parliamentary republic and a fiscally decentralised country with four
layers of government: municipality, province or metropolitan area (Upper-
local), region and central State. These institutions are autonomous from each
other, with their statute (“Statuto”), powers and functions defined according
to the constitution. The lowest tier, the municipality (“Comune”), must act
as a legislative body. It possesses its own government and the following
governing bodies:
• the city council (“Consiglio Comunale”), which has the aim of control
and guidance;
• the executive committee (“Giunta Comunale”), which has “residual
jurisdiction” and manages functions that are not managed by other
bodies; and
• the mayor, that is the executive and representative authority.
Italian municipalities must face expenditures and the revenues to fund their
expenditure. The expenditures are largely spent in land and environment
management, education, social services, local security and public transport.
On the other hand, municipalities can provide revenues by means of grants
(from central government, regions and provinces) and local taxes. Between
local taxes, the I.C.I.6, introduced in 1992 and applied to the real estate in
the municipality, represented the main source of revenue. Other important
sources include the income-tax surcharge, the waste tax and fees in general.
Part of the expenditure (approximately 30% of local expenses) is funded
through intergovernmental grant, mainly transferred unconditionally. In
principle, each year, central government define the total amount of grants
to allocate to the municipalities in the budget law, in which they also define
the criteria (according to equity and efficiency principles) for the allocation.
The literature on the argument has focussed on the fact that these grants are
6Mayors are free to set the tax rate between 0.4% and 0.7% of the real estate value.
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largely not formula based (Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano 2015)7
and thus are subject to political use8.
Municipalities have a specific electoral rule that was designed to guarantee
local political stability9. The mayor is directly elected, he must be in charge
for five years and he or she cannot be re-elected for more than two terms.
The law states two different rules between municipalities with more than
15,000 inhabitants and municipalities with a population lower than the lat-
ter threshold. In the first case the mayor is elected through a single round
race and the candidate that polls more votes wins (plurality voting system);
in the second, the mayor is elected by a two-round system. In the first stage
the voters cast two preferences: the mayor and the party list. The mayor
is elected if he receives at least one vote more than 50% of the total vote.
If nobody achieves this threshold, the second stage takes place: the vote is
only for the mayor and the two most-voted candidates run against each other
(Bordignon, Turati, 2014).
In our sample period the political scenario was dominated by two main coali-
tions: the centre-right coalition formed by parties linked to the conservative
ideology, and the centre-left coalition formed by parties linked to the pro-
gressive ideology. From 2008 to 2010, the time involved in our analysis, the
centre-right coalition was in charge10.
If the electoral run mainly between two coalitions was evident at the national
level, then at the local level, the evidence decreases. Thus, it is difficult to
ideologically classify the Italian mayors, especially for the small municipal-
ities that are subject to the “first-past-the- post” system. However, it may
be easier to classify the mayors of the biggest cities as “right” or “left”.
3.2.2 The elimination of the property tax on the main
dwelling
The abolition of the property tax on main dwelling (I.C.I.) was largely dis-
cussed in 2006’s electoral race. It represented the main tax reform in Silvio
Berlusconi’s (the leader of the centre-right coalition) electoral programme.
7The Italian legislators have recognized the weakness of political distortion in grant
allocation system and the will to move toward a formula based system. The law n.32/2009
introduced the necessity to establish parameters to calculate standard expenditure needs.
8In the case of grant allocated for compensating the property tax abolition, the central
government decided each year the amount of resources for compensation; in addition, the
huge uncertainty in the data of the amount of revenues from the property tax gives room
for political discretion in the allocation of that grant.
9Law 81/1993.
10In 2011, the center-right coalition was substituted by a government of national union
in order to face the deep economic crisis.
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By a tight margin, the 2006 electoral race was won by the centre-left coali-
tion, the Union (“L’Unione”), led by Romano Prodi. Once elected, Prodi’s
government reformed the property tax on main dwellings, decreasing the tax.
In 2008, after Prodi’s government crisis, there was a new electoral race. The
elections were won by the centre-right coalition; the winner coalition was
formed by two parties,“Popolo della Liberta`” and “Lega Nord” while the
center-left coalition was formed by “Partito Democratico” and “Italia dei
valori”. The election also involved a third coalition formed by the centrist
party, “Unione di Centro, UDC”. The first act of Berlusconi’s government
was to abolish the main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.) (Law n. 126, July 24
2008).
We argued in the introduction about the concerns due to the reform: how
and how much should the refund be?
Italian government decided to fund 1,700 millions11 to substitute the amount
of I.C.I. no longer being collected12. In addition, it assigned the State-
Municipalities and Local Entities Conference (“Conferenza Stato-citta´ and
enti locali”) to rule about the criteria and methods for regulating the amount
of the new grant to allocate to the municipalities.
However, the lack of revenues from the property tax on the main dwellings
led to fiscal stress for the municipal budget.
In this scenario, municipalities faced a further reduction in their fiscal auton-
omy. At the same time, Italian municipalities experienced considerable grant
cuts due to both the local fiscal reform (and the will of improving the local
taxation) and the austerity measures with the aim of eliminating the ineffi-
ciencies in local expenditures. To avoid fiscal stress, the government decided
to transfer, immediately, to municipalities 50% of the amount of property
tax (I.C.I.) collected for the main dwelling in 200713. The Court of Audi-
tors and the interior minister were the institutions with control aim14 for the
allocation mechanism. The rules about grant allocation remained the same
for the entire time series while the amount of resources to fund the grants
changed each year according to the budget law.
We test the presence of political distortion because we suspect weakness in
the grant allocation mechanism. First of all, the manipulation may occur due
to the high uncertainty in municipal data concerning the amount of revenues
from the main dwelling property tax plus the uncertainty in the total amount
of resources that government must refund to the municipalities. Indeed, past
11The law regulated the duty to certificate revenues of the I.C.I. on the main dwelling
no longer collected in 2008.
12This amount was added to 904 millions funded by Prodi’s government.
13Decree of June/19/2008.
14Decree n.154/2008, subparagraph 6 and 7, converted into law n. 189/2008.
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municipal accounting rules allowed room for no transparent policies15. Thus
data uncertainty was due to the structural caveats in the budget rules. In
addition, the absence of a punishment mechanism for lying municipalities
may induce moral hazard from local politicians into data communication.
Indeed, the grant was mainly formulated according to the data on main
dwelling property tax in 2007. Hence, politicians may overestimate those
data in order to obtain more resources in grant.
3.3 Methodology and Empirical Model
3.3.1 Methodology
This section describes the empirical strategy used to identify how being
aligned or not aligned to the government affects the predetermined outcomes.
We utilise Lee’s approach (2001 and 2008) for implementing the Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD) in a political context.
There are various ways of implementing the RDD strategy using both para-
metric and nonparametric analysis (Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012).
The parametric approach uses all the observations in the sample to build the
outcome as a function of both treatment and rating variable. The nonpara-
metric approach uses the observations in the sample close to the cut-point,
called bandwidth, where the functional form is more likely to be linear16.
The regression discontinuity (RD) approach may be considered the best
method for testing our hypothesis (Lee 2001, 2008). The RDD is a quasi-
experimental method and its major use is in studying the impact of a policy
around a cut-off. It makes possible to analyse the observations on both sides
of the reference point and to capture differences or analogies: observations
just above the threshold are considered similar to observations just below
the threshold. In this way, we can identify the differences in response to a
fiscal policy between municipalities in the treatment and municipalities in
the control group.
The RDD is defined as an estimation of whether or not the outcome variable
15The method of “competenza finanziaria” did not clearly define local revenues and local
expenditures. In 2015 the government introduced the method of “competenza finanziaria
potenziata” that better defines the debts of municipalities.
16The simplest approach is to compare observations very close to the threshold (non-
parametric approach); however this method can produce unprecise estimate and it needs
a large number of observations. Instead, given the relatively limited number of observa-
tions (that is the problem of several analysis) around the reference point, the alternative
approach (parametric approach) based on the use of all available data together with a
control function can be used.
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exhibits a jump at the threshold of the rating variable. The magnitude of
the jump can be estimated in two ways: by using all the observations in
the sample, or by using a local regression that reduces the observation to a
bandwidth around the threshold of the rating variable, where the functional
form is most likely linear (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). There are two types
of strategies for specifying the functional form of the single-rating RD case
(Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012):
• The parametric approach, which uses all the observations in the sample
to build the outcome as a function of the treatment and the rating
variable, and
• the nonparametric approach, which uses the observations in the sample
close to the cut-off point, called the bandwidth, where the functional
form is more likely to be linear.
We use both strategies for the Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis; we
compare the municipalities in which the mayor who won the election was
aligned to the central government against the municipalities in which the
mayor who won the election was not aligned to the central government. In
particular, Lee(2001) explained the reasons why it is useful to use the mayor’s
margin of victory over the candidate that came second as a rating variable.
He illustred that this represents a quasi-random variation in party winners
because in a very tight race the winning party is likely to be determined
by pure chance. The randomness of the tight margin is added to the un-
predictability in voting behaviour. Thus, it appears to be an appropriate
method to test whether or not the government allocated resources to com-
pensate the abolition of the main dwelling property tax according to political
motives. As described in the following pages, we use the rating variable de-
fined by Lee (2001) but we relax the definition of tight margin.
Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015) represent the second main
reference for the empirical strategy implemented in our paper. They tested
whether or not the government had the ability to transfer more resources to
those municipalities clustered as “politically linked to the government”17.
Their empirical strategy can also be used to test our hypothesis. However,
17We have discussed it in Chapter 1. They provide a political agency model to test the
alignment effect in the allocation of grants. They point on the following features: rational
voter interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent competence; grants are
unobservable to voters (Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli, Redoano, 2015). They use a regression
discontinuity design on Italian municipalities data. They find that the alignment effect
exists, so the national government will use the grant as a tool to benefit the aligned local
incumbent and challengers. Furthermore, they also test the flypaper effect for Italian
municipalities.
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the main difference with Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015)’s
paper is the composition of the dependent variable. Indeed, our analysis em-
ploys the grant received by the municipalities for compensating the property
tax on main dwelling abolition instead of the “ classical” grants mainly used
in the literature. Our time series last from 2008 to 2010 according to the
property tax reform. However, it is important to highlight that abolition
of the main dwelling property tax was not a structural reform in the fiscal
Italian scenario and it was reintroduced by the 2011 budget law18.
In the next section we discuss in more detail the empirical model used to test
our hypothesis.
3.3.2 The Empirical Model
Our paper uses the same approach as Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Re-
doano (2015), but with a different type of grant. We are not interested in
finding political motives behind the allocation of “classical” grants but in
testing the possibility of a hidden effect due the main dwelling property tax
reform: did it introduce political distortion?
In particular, the model we estimate is the following, for i = 1...N munici-
palities observed in the time periods (2008, 2009 and 2010):
(1) Granti,t = α0Alignedi,t + f(Margini,t;Alignedi,t) +
+ β0 + β1Xi,t + µi + ζt + i,t
where Granti,t represents the amount of resources that the government al-
located to substitute the property tax (I.C.I.) on the main dwelling; Alignedi,t
is the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mayor’s party belongs to
the government coalition and 0 otherwise; Margini,t (the rating variable
19)
represents the margin of alignment, which we will define in more detail in
the lines below; Xi,t is the matrix of the control variables, containing the
lag of the per-capita revenues collected from the property tax on the main
dwelling:
ζt is the time dummy and µi the municipality fixed effect.
Our empirical strategy is based on an alternative approach, as we employ
a control function20 in the equation (1). This control function consists in a
18We can only test for short-run time-series (in 2011 Monti’s government reintroduced
the property tax on the main dwelling).
19We include the rating variable in our impact model to correct the selection bias due
to selection of the sample.
20In general, our control function can be defined: f = α1Margini,t +
+α2Margin
2
i,t + ..... + αpMargin
p
i,t + β1Margini,tAlignedi,t + β2Margin
2
i,t + .... +
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pth-order polynomial to add to the binary treatment in the regression21. It
also contains the interaction between the rating and the treatment variables.
This can be important because it can control the fact that the treatment
variable may also impact the slope of the regression line and not only the
intercept.
We are interested in the estimation of the coefficient α0, which measures the
discontinuity effect for treatment. In sum, it represents the marginal impact
of the programme at the cut-point. The significance and positiveness of the
coefficient proves the existence of the so-called “partisan effect”.
3.3.3 Data Description
For constructing our variables, we collect data from many sources. Our data
are observed at the municipal level. We study the Italian municipalities
belonging to regions that do not possess autonomous status, as the munici-
palities in autonomous regions feature different fiscal rules; thus, their exclu-
sion guarantees homogeneity in municipal fiscal rules. Therefore, our sample
is restricted to municipalities in 15 Italian ordinary statute regions (“re-
gioni a Statuto Ordinario”): Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia-
Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Lazio, Molise, Campania,
Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria.
We collect data regarding grants compensating for the main dwelling prop-
erty tax 22 (“Trasferimenti compensativi I.C.I. abitazione principale, art. 1,
c. 1, d.l. 93/08”) from the minister interior’s web-site23, specifically, at sec-
tion “Trasferimenti erariali e Attribuzioni di entrata da federalismo fiscale
delle amministrazioni provinciali, nonche´ attribuzione da fondo di solidariet
comunale e contributi per i comuni”. These data are included in the section
“other grants” (“Altri contributi generali”).
We also collect data on the main dwelling property tax (I.C.I.) from the sec-
tion “Finanza Locale”24of the the interior minister’s web-site. The data are
included in “Certificati Consuntivi di Bilancio” in columns “Riscossioni in
conto Competenza” and “Riscossioni in conto Residui”25.
+βpMargin
p
i,tAlignedi,t.
21Many functional forms can be tested to define which fits the data in the best way, in
order to minimize the bias.
22They represent the amount of money that the government, towards the Interior Min-
ister, decided to transfer to municipalities to compensate the abolition of the property tax
on main dwelling.
23The Italian Interior Ministry dataset is available on internet.
24We use the per-capita amount of property tax on main dwelling as control.
25Before the reform of municipal budgets in 2015, the balance sheet of Italian municipal-
ities were formed by three columns: “Accertamenti”, “Riscossioni in conto Competenza”
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Data for municipal elections26 are collected from the section “Archivio storico
delle elezioni” from 2004 to 201027. Furthermore, information about mayors
and the executive committee (party, job, education etc.) are also collected
from the section “Anagrafe degli Amministratori”.
Data on grants or the amount of property tax on main dwelling are treated
in per capita terms. Therefore, data on the Italian population are collected
from the demographic section of the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) website . All others variables or statistics are obtained from ISTAT
web-site.
3.3.4 Variables Description
In this section, we describe the variables used in our empirical model.
The rating variable for the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is the
margin of alignment (Lee, 2001). It is defined as the difference between the
percentage of votes gained by the winning candidate and the percentage of
votes obtained by the runner-up if the winner is aligned with the central
government and minus this difference if the mayor is not aligned (Bracco,
Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano, 2015). Since the electoral rule is not uni-
form for all Italian municipalities28, we calculate the margin according to
Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano (2015):
• If the municipality has a population below 15,000 inhabitants the mar-
gin is calculated on the first-round,
• while if the municipality has a population greater or equal 15,000 in-
habitants, it depends on whether the mayor is elected in the first round
(because he obtained the absolute majority of votes). If so, then the
first round’s results are used. If a second round occurred, then the
second round’s results are used.
We exclude the municipalities in which the margin of victory is greater than
the 99 percentile. In this way, we avoid using outliers for the margin variable
by eliminating data that may be incorrect and/or pure ideological munici-
palities. In addition, a reasonable rate of margin allows for better comparing
and “Riscossioni in conto Residui”.
26The Italian municipalities election are held each 5 years, unless particular events.
27We use these data for constructing Margin, that is our rating variable. The mayor
elected in 2004 manages the municipality for 5 years. Thus, we start from 2004 because
we need the Margin in 2008.
28See Chapter 1.
81
3. The hidden effect of the reduction in fiscal autonomy and the partisan effect
the two candidates since a candidate that wins the election by a tight margin
could be seen by voters as similar to the loser candidate (Lee, 2001 2008).
Then, we define the treatment variable, which is the alignment variable. It
consists of a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mayor’s party
belongs to the government coalition and 0 otherwise29. That is, we define
“aligned” as the municipalities where the mayor won the election (Lee 2001,
2008) and the mayor’s party is in the government coalition.
In defining the treatment variable we deal with the considerable presence of
civic parties (“lista civica”), apparently not directly linked with the national
political coalitions. Small municipalities in particular are more likely to be
governed by civic parties. So, in this case it remains very difficult to infer
the mayor’s ideology. Table 3.1 shows the Italian political parties; we cluster
also Independent and we associate them to the left or the right according to
the distribution of political parties in the local Executive Committee.
We decide to exclude from our analysis municipalities where the mayor or the
executive committee member could not be associated with the right or the
left coalition. We replicate our analysis also excluding municipalities with a
population of less than 5,000 inhabitants. These municipalities are not sub-
ject to the Domestic Stability Pact (meaning, they have different fiscal rules)
and for them a special status was guaranteed30. However, a high percentage
of those municipalities is managed by a mayor belonging to a civic party,
and so their exclusion cannot be considered a significant loss of power for
our analysis.
Finally, we describe our outcome variable. It represents the grant (in per
capita terms) that governments provided to municipalities to compensate
the loss in revenues from the abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
We exclude from the analysis the observations below the 1 percentile and up
to the 99 percentle for the panel series of the grant per capita. In this way
we minimise the number of likely incorrect data31.
We use as control only the lag of the revenues collected by the property tax
on dwellings 32 (obviously, this variable is expressed in per capita terms).
We must highlight that we conduct the analysis not on all the municipalities
29We consider two main Italian political actors, center-left and center-right coalitions.
Since 2008 to 2010 the government were formed by the center-right coalition. This simply
means that when the alignment dummy assumes value 1 the mayor is associated to the
center-right coalition while when the alignment dummy assumes values 0 the mayor is
associated to the center-left coalition.
30They received an extra-amount of compensative grant because of the lower population.
31As said in Chapter 2, data on local budgets may be missing or uncorrect.
32The analysis is limited to the abolition of the property tax on main dwelling.
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in the non-autonomous regions33 but on residual municipalities (that is the
ones that remain after implementing our data-cleaning strategy).
33The municipalities in non-autonomous regions are around 6,700.
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Table 3.1: Political classification of parties (2008-2010)
Centre-left Centre-right Indipendent
cen-sin(ls.civiche) alleanza nazionale rinnovamento
comunismo cdl udc
comunisti lega nord cattolici liberali
dem.sin. casa della liberta` ccd
democratici sinistra cen-des cdu
fed. Verdi destra centro
dipietro forza italia democratici popolari
rif.com lg. Nord popolari democratici
com.it liga veneta u.d.eur
partito democratico nuovo psi moderati
f.verdi p. per la liberta` civica margherita
ulivo fi-an-udc
pci an ppi
pds alleanza lombarda autonoma
progressisti polo per la liberta` unione democratica
rifondazione comunista fi-an-udc un.dem.
sinistra fi un. Pop
verdi popolo della liberta` t.ccd
ds cen-des(liste civiche) unione di centro
dipie.occh. bisotti
democr-progresso
dl. Marg
intesa democratica
l’unione
patto democratici
riformista
Note: independents are classified according to the political parties in local
Executive Committee.
84
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test whether or not the “partisan effect” on grant alloca-
tion following the I.C.I. abolition exists. In this way, we test the presence
of political distortion that followed the fiscal reform. We compare munici-
palities where the mayors (and/or the municipal committee) are aligned to
the central government against those where they are not aligned (Bracco,
Lockwood, Porcelli and Redoano, 2015).
Due to the difficulties in recognising a municipality as “partisan” and the
few observations, we use the parametric analysis. However, we also replicate
the same empirical strategy implemented by Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli and
Redoano (2015): we use the nonparametric analysis as a robustness check,
choosing the IK criterion (Imbens and Kalayanaraman, 2012) and CCT cri-
terion (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014) procedure as the optimal
bandwidth selection criterions.
3.4.1 Graphical Analysis
We use a graphical approach to make the research point clearly. Figures 3.1-
3.4 show the margin of alignment on the horizontal axis and the per-capita
compensatory grant to each municipality on the vertical axis. Each graph
describes the existence of discontinuity for a specific th-order polynomial
functions, from 1 to 4. The figures show a low jump in the distribution of
grants between aligned and unaligned municipalities at Margin = 0.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
Grant Margin Aligned
Population
Mean 39.49393 0.2139752 0.4364346
sd 23.35023 0.180372 0.4959939
N observations 19,260 19,143 4,869
Sample
Mean 45.41804 0.2124344 0.4441608
sd 21.71918 0.1595089 0.4969251
N observations 4,701 4,701 4,701
The table shows the descriptive statistics of compensatory grant (Grant), the absolute value of margin
of victory (Margin) and the dummy aligned that assigns 1 if the mayor belongs to the same coalition
of the government and 0 otherwise, from 2008 to 2010. Panel for population of Italian municipalities
belonging to the ordinary regions exhibits different numbers in the observations. It occurs because
some voices for the data are missing in some years. Panel for sample shows the descriptive statistics
of the sample obtained after outliers delation.
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3.4.2 Parametric Analysis: regression results
We adopt the parametric strategy mainly to deal with the problem of few
observations34 (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The parametric strategy allows to use all the observations in the sample and
not only those located close to the cut-off point, i.e. where the regression
function is more likely to be linear35 (Jacob, Zhu, Somers and Bloom, 2012).
We associate the elimination of outliers for the outcome variable (1 and 99
percentile) and the rating variable (99 percentile of its absolute value) to
the specification of the functional form for the control function in order to
minimize the analysis bias36.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the results. They describe the estimation of the
equation (1) and we regress it for four functional forms in the control function:
Granti,t = α0Alignedi,t+β0 +f(Alignedi,t;Margini,t)+µi+ζt+i,t
We are interested in whether or not a discontinuity at the reference point
exists. This discontinuity is measured by the coefficient α0 in the regression
equation: it measures the change in the allocation of the per-capita grant
due to the mayor political alignment with the central government (i.e. it
measures the so-called “partisan effect”).
The results come from the estimation of OLS regression for all pth-order
polynomial forms used in the control function.
Table 3.3 reports the regression results for the equation with polynomial
control function without the interaction term. All regressions contain the
municipality fixed effect and time dummies; standard errors are clustered at
municipal level.
Firstly, we look at the columns in Table 3.3. Each column represents the
regression results for each functional form in the following order: 1st-order
polynomial (1), 2nd-order polynomial (2), 3rd-order polynomial (3) and 4th-
order polynomial (4).
34We cannot consider in our analysis those municipalities that are not politically iden-
tifiable. This is the reason why we drop a huge number of observations.
35This method gains strength from observations far from the threshold point to estimate
the average outcome for observations close to the threshold point. In order to minimize the
bias, several functional forms can be used for the rating variable (linear, quadratic, cubic,
interaction terms, etc). The choice of the appropriate functional form is conducted by
F-test on higher-order interaction terms and inspecting the residuals (Jacob, Zhu, Somers
and Bloom 2012).
36The trade-off consists in the difficulty to ensure whether or not the functional form of
the relationship between the conditional mean of the dependent variable and the rating
variable is well specialized. Thus, the issue increases the potential for bias (Jacob, Zhu,
Somers and Bloom, 2012).
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Figure 3.1: First-order polynomial function’s RDplot for the per-capita grant.
The figure shows per-capita compensative grant on the vertical axis and the margin of victory on
horizontal axis. Negative value for the margin of victory means that municipalities is not aligned with
the central government.
The results show that a discontinuity coefficient is positive, very low (it
is between 0.15 and 0.05 euros in per-capita terms) and not statistically
significant. Thus, there is no evidence for the existence of the “partisan
effect”; this means that the center-right coalition at central government has
not given more money to those municipalities politically aligned37 to it.
Table 3.4, that reports the regression results for the equation with polynomial
control function with interaction term, confirms the results shown in Table
3.3.
In short, the parametric approach used for estimating the empirical model
statistically seems to confirm that the centre-right central government have
behaved in a transparent manner in allocating the compensatory grants. It
did not allocate more resources to those municipalities politically linked to
37We mean municipalities managed by a mayor (and a municipal committee) linked to
the centre-right coalition.
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Figure 3.2: Second-order polynomial function’s RDplot for the per-capita
grant.
The figure shows per-capita compensative grant on the vertical axis and the margin of victory on
horizontal axis. Negative value for the margin of victory means that municipalities is not aligned with
the central government.
it.
3.5 Robustness check
3.5.1 Nonparametric Analysis
The nonparametric (local) strategy uses the observations close to the cut-
point, contained in an appropriate bandwidth, where the functional form is
more likely to be linear38.
The choice of the appropriate bandwidth for the local strategy is challeng-
38The local strategy views the estimation of treatment effect as local randomization and
it limits the analysis only to the observations that are close to the cut-point, excluding
those that are too far from that point.
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Table 3.3: Regression results: parametric analysis 1/2
p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4)
Outcome Grant Grant Grant Grant
Margin -0.243 -0.177 0.0953 0.763
(0.206) (0.569) (1.253) (2.594)
Aligned 0.136 0.125 0.0953 0.0502
(0.123) (0.148) (0.178) (0.225)
Aligned2 -0.117 -1.219 -5.84
(0.963) (4.678) (16.46)
Aligned3 1.167 12.15
(4.872) (37.37)
Aligned4 -8.294
(27.48)
2009.year -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.228*** -0.229***
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.018) (0.018)
2010.year 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270***
(0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0386)
Constant 45.34*** 45.34*** 45.36*** 45.38***
(0.0625) (0.0738) (0.0882) (0.113)
Observations 4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701
Municipalities 2,028 2,028 2,028 2,028
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
The table shows the results for the grant per-capita using OLS estimation with time and fixed effects.
Each column reports the estimation for different forms in the control function: (1) the first-polynomial
case, (2) the second-polynomial case, (3) the third-polynomial case and (4)the fourth-polynomial case.
RD sample contains all local election where the winner belongs to the centre-left or the centre-right
coalition. We are interested in the result for the coefficient on aligned dummy. Significance at 1% is
represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at
municipal level.
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Table 3.4: Regression results: parametric analysis 2/2
p(1)-interaction p(2)-interaction p(3)-interaction p(4)-interaction
Outcome Grant Grant Grant Grant
Margin -0.353 -0.0348 0.819 2.966
(0.251) (0.706) (1.657) (3.462)
Aligned 0.117 0.15 0.118 0.0334
(0.124) (0.147) (0.178) (0.228)
Aligned2 -0.543 -3.878 -18.27
(1.167) (6.121) (21.54)
Aligned3 3.466 37.26
(6.335) (48.76)
Aligned4 -25.46
(36.08)
Interaction 0.368 -0.759 -1.96 -3.919
(0.38) (1.079) (2.395) (4.801)
Interaction2 2.167 7.045 20.23
(1.799) (8.586) (30.46)
Interaction3 -5.222 -36.38
(8.475) (68.97)
Interaction4 23.64
(49.95)
2009.year -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.227***
(0.0178) (0.018) (0.0181) (0.0181)
2010.year 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.272***
(0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0386)
Constant 45.31*** 45.34*** 45.39*** 45.46***
(0.0709) (0.0892) (0.117) (0.156)
Observations 4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701
Municipalities 2,028 2,028 2,028 2,028
R-squared 0.1 0.101 0.101 0.101
The table shows the results for the grant per-capita using OLS estimation with time and fixed effects.
Each column reports the estimation for different forms in the control function: (1) the first-polynomial
case, (2) the second-polynomial case, (3) the third-polynomial case and (4)the fourth-polynomial case,
with interactions term. RD sample contains all local election where the winner belongs to the centre-
left or the centre-right coalition. We are interested in the result for the the coefficient on aligned
dummy. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard
errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
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Figure 3.3: Third-order polynomial function’s RDplot for the per-capita
grant.
The figure shows per-capita compensative grant on the vertical axis and the margin of victory on
horizontal axis. Negative value for the margin of victory means that municipalities is not aligned with
the central government.
ing for the analysis. Choosing the bandwidth in an accurate way gives the
possibility to solve the trade-off between precision and bias. In fact, a larger
bandwidth may guarantee a greater precision in the estimation of the model.
On the other side, the linear specification may be less accurate and it may
lead to bias when treatment effect is estimated.
Since our sample size could be considered not so large, particularly around
the cut-off point, we have used the parametric estimation as the principal
method of analysis.
The main decision in the application of the nonparametric analysis regards
the choice of the methodology for the selection of the optimal bandwidth39.
39The literature on Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) proposed two procedures
for choosing the bandwidth. The first is the “cross-validation” procedure and the second
one the “plugs-in” procedure. Both procedures concern the concept of mean square error
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Figure 3.4: Fourth-order polynomial function’s RDplot for the per-capita
grant.
The figure shows per-capita compensative grant on the vertical axis and the margin of victory on
horizontal axis. Negative value for the margin of victory means that municipalities is not aligned with
the central government.
We select the bandwidth using the IK method, by Imbens and Kalyanara-
man’ s (2012) and CCT (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)criterion.
Then, we implement the OLS estimation on the local linear model for the
bandwidths selected.
The results of the parametric analysis are summarized in Tables 3.5. The
(MSE), which exactly measures the trade-off, discussed above, between bias and precision.
In addition, both procedures are also computationally complicated. As stated before, the
“plug-in” procedure defines the optimal bandwidth according to the sample data and it
balances the degree of precision and bias. The concept is to find a formula that defines
a bandwidth that minimizes a particular function of precision and bias. Fan and Gij-
bels (1996) developed a method in the context of local linear regression that DesJardins
and McCall (2008) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) modified for the RD setting.
Recently Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) elaborated a method for the optimal
bandwidth selection for sharp RD, sharp kink RD, fuzzy RD, fuzzy kink RD.
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second column in Table 3.5 describes the results of the equation (1) in the
case of CCT bandwidth selector. The discontinuity is measured again by the
coefficient α0 and for a bandwidth around 15% (0.15) of the margin of victory
(Margin). The regressions contain the municipality fixed effect, time dum-
mies and standard errors are clustered at municipal level. The discontinuity
coefficient remains low, positive and not statistically significant. Thus even
the nonparametric approach does not confirm the existence of the so-called
“partisan effect”.
We replicate the estimation of the model using the IK method, by Im-
bens and Kalyanaraman’ s (2012). The estimation results (for a bandwidth
around 9% (0.09) of the margin of victory (Margin), shown in third column
of Table 3.5 did not change from the CCT selection criterion case. The dis-
continuity coefficient remains low, positive and not statistically significant.
Thus it does not confirm the existence of the so-called “partisan effect”.
In short, the nonparametric approach confirms what have emerged in es-
timating our model by the parametric approach: the centre-right central
government have behaved in a transparent manner.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we empirically tested the existence of the so-called “partisan
effect” on the grant that the central government allocated to Italian munici-
palities to compensate the abolition of the main dwelling property tax.
The empirical model is built to test whether or not the municipalities po-
litically aligned with the central government received more resources than
municipalities that were not politically aligned. Aligned mayors may use
these extra-resources to cut taxes or to rise the expenditures or they may
face the lower reduction of resources with a lower increase in taxation or a
lower decrease in expenditure40.
To test the “partisan effect”, we have used a dataset on Italian municipal
public finance, local and national elections and politicians’ information41 over
the period of the abolition of the main dwelling property tax (2008-2010).
Our empirical strategy is based on a RDD and we have estimated the model
40The extra-resources (allocated for political connection motives) are not large enough.
It is evident from the empirical results that it is equal approximately to a number much
less than 1 euro per capita. However, we don’t simply focus on the extra-amount received
by a municipality because we are in a scenario of reduction in grants. We want to test
who wins and who loses from the property tax reform.
41Data are collected from the Interior Minister web-site.
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Table 3.5: Nonparametric analysis
CCT IK
Outcome Grant Grant
Margin -0.0716 -1.523
(1.68) (4.862)
Aligned 0.112 0.129
(0.286) (0.583)
2009.year -0.168*** -0.122***
(0.0292) (0.0408)
2010.year 0.270*** 0.366***
(0.0572) (0.0774)
Constant 42.85*** 42.99***
(0.144) (0.294)
Observations 2,036 1,301
Municipalities 993 662
R-squared 0.084 0.086
The table shows the results for the grant per-capita using OLS estimation. Each column reports the
estimation for different optimal bandwidth selection method: the IK (Imbens and Kalyanaraman,
2012) criterion (±0.09 of margin of victory) and the CCT (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
criterion (±0.15 of margin of victory). RD sample contains all local election where the winner belongs
to the centre-left or the centre-right coalition. We are interested in the result for the the coefficient
on aligned dummy. Time dummies and fixed effects are included in all regressions in columns 2 and
3. Significance at 1% is represented by ***, at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in
brackets clustered at municipal level. The number of observations change according to the bandwidth
selector method.
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through a parametric approach.
The empirical results demonstrate that the centre-right central government
coalition did not allocate more resources to municipalities who were politi-
cally aligned to it. This means that the abolition of the property tax on the
main dwelling did not achieve also an hidden goal: even if municipalities’
increased fiscal dependence on the central state, the government did not al-
locate more resources to the municipalities politically aligned to it.
The main question was the following:
• Was there room for the government to allocate funds to aligned munic-
ipalities?
In our opinion, the manipulation may occur due to the high uncertainty in
municipal data concerning the amount of revenues from the main dwelling
property tax plus the uncertainty in the total amount of resources that gov-
ernment must refund to municipalities. In the first case, the data uncertainty
was due to the structural caveats in budget rules. Thus, the rules that defined
municipal revenues and expenditures allowed a sort of discretionary power
to the bureaucrats to manipulate the data. In the second case, the central
government decided the total amount of resource for the compensation in the
budget law42.
In conclusion, these two characteristics as well as the weakness of the ex-post
control43 and the absence of a punishment mechanism for lying municipali-
ties did not allow the existence of the so-called “partisan effect”. Thus the
above empirical analysis demonstrates that mechanism of allocation of grant
regarding the abolition of the main dwelling property tax was transparent.
The main dwelling property tax reform did not leave room for political dis-
tortions.
42In general, the government allocated less resource than the total amount of the col-
lected I.C.I. in 2007, in line with the constant reduction in the amount of intergovernmental
grants.
43In Chapter 1 we have discussed a-priori controls by the Court of Auditors about the
data on the main dwelling property tax.
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Conclusion
This PhD thesis attempts to investigate two main issues:
1. The behaviour of Italian municipalities in terms of local fiscal policy as
reaction to the property tax abolition and reduction of fiscal autonomy
and
2. central government’s opportunistic behaviour in formulating grants for
municipalities to compensate the abolition of property tax on main
dwelling.
We employ the empirical methods consolidated in the literature such as Re-
gression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and Regression Kink Design (RKD).
Both methods allow to compare observations close to a selected cut-off point.
What emerges from the second chapter is that Italian municipalities reacted
to the abolition of the main dwelling property tax by increasing revenues
from the waste tax. In particular, we divide Italian municipalities into “win-
ners”, if they gained in terms of revenues as a consequence of the property
tax abolition, or “losers”, if they lost in terms of revenues as a consequence
of the main dwelling property tax abolition. The “losers” municipalities in-
creased the revenues from the waste tax more than the “winners” ones. In
addition, the more they were punished the more they increased the revenues
from the waste tax, demonstrating a fear of loss in revenues. We also in-
vestigate the likely use of other fiscal tools. In particular, we test whether
or not Italian municipalities used the current expenditure or revenues from
building permits as a reaction to the abolition of the main dwelling property
tax. However, we find no evidence for the use of different fiscal tools from
the waste tax. The reduction in fiscal autonomy yielded a switch, in part,
between property tax and waste tax with subsequent loss in terms of equity
(the property tax responds to the equity principle while the waste tax does
not). This switch was stronger for “losers” municipalities.
The third chapter tests the presence of the so-called “partisan effect” in al-
locating grants for compensating the abolition of the main dwelling property
tax. We define the “partisan effect” as the government’s non transparent
mechanism for providing more resources to municipalities politically aligned
to it. This may be the result of the uncertainty that characterised the fiscal
reform in 2008 and the absence of a system of controls and fines for the data
communication from the municipalities to the centre.
Our analysis demonstrates that the presence of the “partisan effect” is not
empirically proved. Thus we have concluded that the reform of main dwelling
property tax was transparent in resources allocation.
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3.6 Conclusion
Our paper suggests the need to improve the efficiency of the fiscal mech-
anism of substitution between a local tax and grant from the centre. In
particular, it is necessary to find mechanism, based on both grants and local
taxes that guarantees fiscal autonomy and mitigates the loss of resources, the
loss of fiscal autonomy and the likely risk in equality loss.
Further research can elaborate a theoretical model able to fit the behaviour
of local politicians. Furthermore, as noted by reviewers, future research can
be directed also to investigate the expenditure side, such as whether or not
during huge grant cuts from the centre, municipalities achieved the goal of
minimising the current expenditure. This may explain the lack of evidence
of further current expenditure cuts as a reaction to the abolition of the main
dwelling property tax. By contrast, it is also possible that the policy makers
prefer not to cut the expenditure in order to gain rents from it. They may
use the further resources in a pork-barrel manner in order to maximise their
votes and the probability of being re-elected.
We suggest that future researches should test the presence of these effects.
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